

**International Congress of Aesthetics
2007 “Aesthetics Bridging Cultures”**

**The priestess’s giggle. Tragedy and
comedy as the work of a single person**

Dr Constantinos V. Proimos,

*Philosophy, Hellenic Open University,
Greece*

In the opening page of his introduction to the *Symposium*, Paul Friedlander remarks that this dialogue is one of the most important chapters in the history of Platonism, in terms of its lasting influence and can only be matched by the *Republic* and *Timaeus*.¹ It is indeed so, if one considers the impact of the *Symposium* to Xenophon, Plutarch and the Stoics, Plotinus, Athenaeus, Macrobius, Origen, Augustine, Marsiglio Ficino and the Italian Renaissance, Erasmus and others among which I would like to add Martin Heidegger as well and explain later.² The reason why the *Symposium* is extremely interesting for philosophers of art is that it contains one of the most compelling positive definitions of art as *poiesis*, pronounced of course in passing but constituting, nevertheless, a viable alternative to the negative definition of art as *mimesis* in book X of Plato’s *Republic* (Πρόσεξε το θετικό/αρνητικό, σύμφωνα με ποιους;). In Diotima’s speech, we read:

“There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of all arts are all poets or makers.” “Very true.” [replies Socrates to Diotima] “Still,” she said, “you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; only that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest, and is concerned with music and metre, is termed poetry, and they who possess poetry in this sense of the word are called poets.” “Very true.” I said.³ (205b5-c10)

One way to read the passage is that Plato here distinguishes between two notions of poetry. The first is a broad one covering “the processes of all art” and meaning creation, i.e. passage from non being to being, that is clearly non mimetic, although does not exclude mimesis. The second, is poetry in a narrower, (specific?) sense, as the specific art of verse, concerned with “music and metre” with whom all are familiar. Plato’s definition of art in the *Symposium* clearly differs from the account of the arts expounded in book X of the *Republic* where the painter as “a creator of appearances,” via imitation, is the model for all artists, “the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe.”⁴ (595-598) It is no mere coincidence that in his 1936

essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art” Martin Heidegger claims: (Δημιουργός και ποιητής θα πρέπει να διαχωριστούν;)

“All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, *essentially poetry*...Poetry is thought of here in so broad a sense and at the same time in such intimate unity of being with language and word, that we must leave open whether art, in all its modes from architecture to poesy, exhausts the nature of poetry...Art, as the setting-into-work of truth is poetry.”⁵

Heidegger’s understanding of poetry derives from Plato’s *Symposium*. The reason why this comparison is quite telling is not merely literary or a question of sources. Identifying a most antimimetic thinker like Heidegger with Plato, says a lot about the Platonic heritage in the philosophy of art. Platonism may still provide resources to philosophers of art to think an alternative definition of art to mimesis; thus they may conceptualize several art movements of modernity, beginning with neoplasticism and constructivism and reaching up to contemporary installation work, which were explicitly hostile to mimesis. However, getting rid of the notion of mimesis is no small task for it requires rethinking the entire epistemology and purpose of aesthetics, which is an arduous business and has hardly been done.

The paper could very well have ended here. Alas, this is impossible. For this specific antimimetic resource or tip of the *Symposium* does come from Plato, after all, and not from any other thinker. And as Goethe said: “He who could explain to us when men like Plato spoke in earnest, when in jest or half-jest, what they wrote from conviction and what merely for the sake of the argument, would certainly render us an extraordinary service and contribute greatly to our education.”⁶ What is said in the dialogues equally matters with how is said, who says it and in what circumstances she/he utters it. For it is important to remember that this passage comes from a dialogue, it is therefore impossible to neglect the dialogical and dramatic form of Plato’s arguments and not consider the fact that such passages are pronounced by certain speakers in Plato’s dialogues and not by Plato himself. It is therefore necessary to ponder carefully upon what is meant by Diotima’s words about all art as poetry, “passage of non-being into being”, in the dramatic context of the *Symposium*. And yet there is hardly an agreement among the commentators of the *Symposium* about the overall assessment of Diotima’s and Socrates’ speech, particularly as it contrasts with Alcibiades’ episode and panygeric speech, which, according to Friedrich Schleiermacher, “is the crest and the crown of the whole dialogue.”⁷ In this paper I wish to show that love is the impulse of all poetry in the broader sense of creation aforementioned. But love in the *Symposium* is personified by both Socrates and Alcibiades although the two characters represent two very different if not contrasting kinds of love. On the basis of the interpretation of *Symposium’s* last scene, I shall argue that love is one and tragicomic and that both kinds of love that Socrates and Alcibiades represent do have their tragicomic aspects. This is the reason why the *Symposium* ends with Socrates’ teaching to Agathon and Aristophanes that tragedy and comedy is the work of a single person.

I. Love as the impulse of creation

It is Diotima, the priestess from Mantinea, honoring Zeus, that, according to Socrates, told him that poetry is “all creation or passage of non being into being.” Having well started his encomium of love, after Agathon’s speech, Socrates narrates to his banquet fellows how he was instructed about the art of love by Diotima, the priestess, whom he describes as wise, in fact, as having “all the authority of an accomplished sophist” (208 c1). Diotima argues that:

“all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love, *Eros*; but they who are drawn towards him by an other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers-the name of the whole is appropriated to those whose affection takes one form only-they alone are said to love or to be lovers.” (205 d1)

Love, according to Diotima, is apparently a great force, that contrary, to the eulogies of previous speakers is neither fair nor good (201 e5) but a mean between ignorance and wisdom, (203e5) a spirit, *δαίμων*, between the divine and the mortal and a mediator between men and Gods, (202 e1-e5) being the son of *Poros* and *Penia*, never in want and never in wealth. (203 c5) That man who loves the beautiful, loves the good and strives for happiness by wishing to possess the good everlastingly (205 a10) and for that very reason wishes to give birth in beauty. Love is thus love of generation and concomitantly of eternity and immortality, for it is only through birth and generation that the mortal nature becomes everlasting, (206 e-5-207) i.e. leaves “a name which shall be eternal.” (208 c5) However, this procreation need not solely concern the body and children as the body’s proper offspring but most importantly concerns the soul that gives birth to wisdom and virtue, temperance and justice. (209 a5-b1) The secret of love is the ascend from the love of beautiful forms, to the love of beauty in form in general, the beauty of the mind, the beauty of laws, institutions and sciences, the science of beauty and finally:

“...beauty absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things...But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty-the divine beauty I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colors and vanities of human life-thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?” (211 d5-212 a5)

Diotima’s words confirm Socrates’ conclusion that love is an instrument for the attainment of all worthy tasks in this life. (212 b1-c1) Therefore love, *Eros*, is the impulse of all poetry understood as creation or passage of non-being into being.⁸ To make things even more explicit, many commentators have identified love, *Eros* with the figure of Socrates in the dialogue: Schleiermacher claims that “the name of love is given to the endeavor to attain wisdom.”⁹ Friedlander suggests that “Socrates has long passed the lowest stage where love is of a single beautiful body in contrast to

Alcibiades.”¹⁰ Robert G. Bury and Andrea Wilson Nightingale agree that the philosophic impulse is ultimately identical with *Eros*¹¹ and that *Eros* is the philosopher.¹² Finally, Pierre Hadot claims that the *Symposium* as a dialogue is devoted to describe Socrates’ way of life which is precisely that of the ideal philosopher.¹³ According to Hadot, the characteristics of Socrates and the traits of *Eros* tend to identify, only that *Eros* personifies in a mythical manner what Socrates represents historically.¹⁴ The philosopher, continues Hadot, never attains wisdom for she/he is in a position of mean but always progresses to its direction as he/she desires wisdom from which philosophy is already separated from, with great distance.¹⁵ Philosophy is therefore defined by what it lacks, by what it always escapes it and yet by what it holds steadfastly upon its vision.¹⁶ Thus understood, poetry as creation is fueled by love and marks, in a positive sense, the steps that the philosopher takes in his ascend towards wisdom.

And yet there are a few other commentators who disagree with the identification of *Eros* with Socrates. Since Alcibiades also gives a speech in praise of love which is also an open confession of his love for Socrates, he also qualifies to be identified with *Eros*. Before however, presenting their views it is necessary to refer to Alcibiades’ episode and his encomium to Socrates with which the dialogue reaches its end. As Bury states, at the time of the *Symposium*, Alcibiades was 34 years old, at the height of his reputation, a brilliant party leader with great intellectual ability and remarkable personal beauty of which he was not a little vain. He was generally considered as a lovable, attractive and extremely delightful person of great powers and equally grand vices¹⁷ not the least one of them being his incontinence, his *acrasia*.¹⁸ Alcibiades enters abruptly the banquet right at the end of Socrates’ speech. (212 d5) He is clearly drunk, as he states himself, and when invited to join the company, he takes his place on the condition that the company resumes drinking along with him. (213) He first does not notice Socrates and when he does, he makes a scene that Socrates always pops up unexpectedly and takes a seat next to the most handsome of the company, in present case, Agathon, the tragic poet, around his thirties and, according to Bury, a man of remarkable beauty, position, reputed effeminacy, wealth, popularity, refinement, education and social tact.¹⁹ Socrates protests at Alcibiades’ licentiousness and advances to him and Alcibiades crowns Socrates’ head with some of the ribands he held. (213 d1-e5) The company asks from Alcibiades to give a speech in praise of love as they all did before him but he, instead, makes Socrates’ encomium, clearly going his own way,²⁰ without stopping to tease him, at the same time. (214 e1-215 b1) He is apparently giving his speech under the influence of alcohol. He repeatedly claims that he wishes to speak the truth and proceeds by comparing Socrates with whom he is in love, with the busts of Silenus which are caricatures from the outside

but present Godly images from the inside. (215 b1, 216 d5-e1) Furthermore, Alcibiades also compares Socrates with a satyr who charms people not with a flute but with his words and has fatally charmed himself, for he confesses feeling like his slave. (215 d1, 219 e1) He then expresses his shame for his ethical conduct when he is around Socrates and does mention that sometimes deliberately avoids him in order not to feel bad. (216 b1-c1) He claims that none from the company really knows Socrates for the latter constantly puts on appearances and none, however beautiful, wealthy and honorable, escapes really his mocking. (216 e1-e5) Subsequently he recounts his numerous efforts to seduce Socrates to which the latter replied with indifference. Alcibiades thus communicates his suffering at his unconsummated love that has made him feel an increasing and maddening passion for knowledge, philosophy and their fruits, namely virtue. (218 a5-b1) He recounts how Socrates keeps denying his sexual solicitations in his typical ironical manner, always finding a way to be superior, contemptuous, derisive and disdainful. (219 c5) He then continues by expounding how Socrates withstands drink, fatigue, cold and erotic temptation, how he thinks silently and during long hours and how courageous he is in battle. (219 e5-220 c1) Socrates, Alcibiades maintains, is like no other man for he frequents the simplest people of Athens, pack asses and smiths, cobblers and curriers, luring them with seemingly ridiculous words that, when pondered upon are, in fact, found to be most divine. (221 e1-222 a5) He complains that he is maltreated by Socrates and warns the others not to let themselves be deceived by him, as he did. (222 b1-b5) Alcibiades' frank and outspoken confession causes laughter at the company. (222 c1) Socrates teases back Alcibiades by casting doubt on his motives and by claiming that all that the latter really wants is Agathon's favor. (222 c1-d5) Alcibiades indeed begs Agathon to lie next to him but the latter prefers to lie next to Socrates. (222 e5-223 a5) The next moment a group of intruders enter the banquet and the company is dispersed, except for Socrates, Agathon, the tragic poet and Aristophanes, the comic one, who listen to Socrates explain them that a true artist is equally competent in tragedy and comedy. (223 d5)

II. Two kinds of love, personified by Socrates and Alcibiades

Nightingale treats Alcibiades with a great critical suspicion for she claims that through Alcibiades' encomium to Socrates, we see

“an infamous and ignoble man struggling and failing to praise a philosopher. Alcibiades' eulogy is thus designed to be a caveat against the ignorant conferral of praise. Alcibiades' interpretation of Socrates *logoi* is subjective and idiosyncratic for he is a man of limited imagination as his encomium abundantly reveals, because of his love of power and honor.”²¹

Alcibiades' praise actually confirms what the Athenians accuse Socrates of, namely that his disavowal of knowledge is insincere and a disguise for contempt for the others, a *hubris* that is directed against the community as a whole.²² But, in fact, Nightingale maintains, the speech of praise in the mouth of a famous politician, presenting Socrates as possessing a greater number of qualities than he actually possesses, in the manner of Isocrates' encomia, reveals the wish to indoctrinate people most in need for instruction, the ignorant and poses with its foolish use of language a very real danger to the city as a whole.²³

Alcibiades is generally thus criticized by the majority of the *Symposium* commentators aforementioned like Schleiermacher, Friedlander, Bury, Hadot and A. E. Taylor.²⁴ Socrates is thus understood as the serious, tragic lover in contrast to Alcibiades, the comic one, whose speech provokes laughter to the banquet company. Socrates however is also criticized by some commentators, including Gregory Vlastos and Martha Nussbaum. For one thing, Socrates seems not to be certain about his feelings towards Alcibiades and thus treats him ironically and ambivalently when he asks if Alcibiades is certain that he is not deceived by him. Socrates never clearly states that he does not want Alcibiades but hides behind words that leave the enigma of his desire to be solved by Alcibiades. Socrates is therefore criticized by Vlastos for his position vis a vis love and Alcibiades altogether:

“We are to love the persons so far, and only insofar, as they are good and beautiful. Now since all too few human beings are masterworks of excellence, and not even the best of those we have the chance to love are wholly free of streaks of the ugly, the mean, the commonplace, the ridiculous, if our love for them is to be only for their virtue and beauty, the individual, in the uniqueness and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato’s theory. It does not provide for love of whole persons, but only for love of the abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities. This is the reason why personal affection ranks so low in Plato’s *scala amoris*...The high climactic moment of fulfillment—the peak achievement for which all lesser loves are to be “used as steps”—is the one farthest removed from affection for concrete human beings.”²⁵

Vlastos’ criticism directed against Plato in general, concerns first and foremost Socrates, the speaker who communicates Diotima’s words about the ascent of love in the banquet. Vlastos’ critical remarks are further employed by Martha Nussbaum that mounts the most elaborate, decisive and explicit criticism of Socrates while simultaneously making a positive case for Alcibiades in the *Symposium*. For her, contrary to all the commentators mentioned before, *Eros*, love is not represented by Socrates but rather by Alcibiades.

Nussbaum claims that Socrates in the *Symposium* is put before us as an example of a man in the process of making himself self sufficient through the ascent that Diotima described.²⁶ But in his quest for moral autonomy which is the deepest thing in Socrates, “the strongest of his moral concerns,” according to Vlastos,²⁷ Socrates becomes a being “without any contingent occurrent desires.”²⁸ It is indeed an open question whether a morally autonomous and self sufficient person can be in love. For Diotima and Socrates connect “the love of particulars with tension, excess and servitude; the love of a qualitatively uniform “sea” [of beauty and goodness] with health, freedom and creativity.”²⁹ Socrates’ life and behavior do indeed exemplify the ascent towards the Good that Diotima described but the price paid for this ascent is high, and it is “psychological distance from the world.”³⁰ Socrates is an excellent albeit deaf human being.³¹ In his ascent towards the forms, Nussbaum claims,

Socrates himself has become one of them, hard, indivisible and unchanging:³² Drink does not make him drunk, cold does not affect him, Alcibiades' naked body does not arouse him and sleeplessness does not make him stop from philosophizing.³³ However this "adherence to rule and refusal to see and feel the particular is what is irrational" Alcibiades would have argued back at Socrates, according to Nussbaum.³⁴ Nussbaum bases her criticism of Socrates on Aristophanes' speech in the *Symposium*, according to which love is the desire and pursuit of wholeness which we are lacking and which we find in our other half, the other significant person for each of us. (192 e5-193 a5) However, in order to get to be the whole, one must be willing to be half, Nussbaum retorts.³⁵ The *Symposium* is all about passionate erotic love³⁶ and yet this is best represented by Alcibiades who wills to be half and in his contingency and fragmentariness professes his love for Socrates. Alcibiades confesses his particular love for Socrates, speaks about his passion for this unique individual without defining and explaining the nature of anything.³⁷ His story is a love story that exposes him naked and vulnerable to the criticism of his company of friends³⁸ who all laugh at his expense. Socrates cannot understand or sympathize with this love because he seems to lack the practical understanding that all of us have, particularly those of us that have not yet taken the first step up Diotima's ladder.³⁹ Alcibiades is willing to tell the truth about Socrates' unique strangeness despite or thanks to his frustrated aims and thus becomes the comic poet of his own disaster.⁴⁰ All laugh at his expense and yet his role is both comic and tragic, it is in fact tragicomic. To the question whether *Eros* and philosophy can live together, whether *Eros* does have a place in a life shaped by practical reason, Nussbaum's answers are negative.⁴¹ For erotic passion makes humans unstable and vulnerable, it makes them overpowered by a force external to practical reason and thus gives enough reasons to disqualify them from goodness, as they disqualify Alcibiades.⁴² *Eros* often feels like slavery or madness, suspending autonomy, rational planning and yet not to succumb to *Eros* is quite inhuman.⁴³ Alcibiades' life seems totally devoted to *Eros* with a maddening intensity and this is why it is to the very end disorderly, buffeted, "inconstant and wasteful of his excellent nature."⁴⁴ *Eros* and philosophy in the sense of stable rationality that Diotima praised are then two mutually exclusive varieties of vision.⁴⁵ "The pure light of the eternal form eclipses or is eclipsed by, the flickering lightning of the opened and unstably moving body" and one must blind oneself to the one in order to have the other.⁴⁶

"The sight of reason begins to see clearly when the sight of the eyes begins to grow dim'-whether from age or because you are learning to be good...We see now

that philosophy is not fully human; but we are terrified of humanity and what it leads to.”⁴⁷

III. Love as one and tragicomic

Indeed Nussbaum furnishes a very compelling, though extremely unorthodox reading of the *Symposium*. For if it is true that eros and philosophy are two mutually exclusive varieties of reason, if it is indeed the case that Socrates and Alcibiades are so contrasting types of people that represent so different types of love, this is a scandal that shakes all philosophy readers. For her, poetry in the sense that Diotima gives it, as passage of non being to being is quite a costly enterprise for, if identified with the ascend, it means to a certain extent, giving up the world. Creation, in the sense aforementioned, requires some distance from the world and this distance seems to be analogous to its magnificence. It is perhaps some consolation that poetry as creation in the broadest possible designation, passage of non being into being, forms alternative worlds into which many have found and still may find refuge, not however without paying a high price. The price, according to Nussbaum, is psychological and practical distance from the world.

Clearly, Nussbaum has a fresh and novel take in the dialogue and the positive case she makes for Alcibiades which is virtually unprecedented in the *Symposium* bibliography is of great value to all *Symposium* readers. And yet a close engagement with her argument results in a feeling that Nussbaum must, after all, be omitting something. Socrates is not as aloof to Alcibiades as she presents him to be. For one thing Socrates never blatantly refuses Alcibiades' offers. Why not suppose that Socrates may very well be enticed by these offers and thus maintains an ambivalence, letting the young man with an enigma about his desires, only in order to capture him harder? Nussbaum fails to account for Socratic irony, which, as Søren Kierkegaard maintains, is the negative element of love, “love's incitement”.⁴⁸ Socratic irony is the seductive force hidden behind Socrates' masks and there are many places in the *Symposium* where Socrates is ironic. Complex irony that applies to Socrates' case, according to Vlastos, means that what is said is and is not meant, at the same time.⁴⁹ So Socrates loves Alcibiades, as Alcibiades loves him but not in the same frank, straightforward and naïve way. Had Socrates really succumbed to Alcibiades' advances, he would have probably lost his favor, or so he probably fears. For according to Alcibiades' own words, what he is really after in Socrates is certainly not his looks but his wisdom and self control, his virtue and temperance, all the abstract qualities that intertwine with his persona. In the actual sexual intercourse between two bodies these qualities play little role and Alcibiades would have had the rare opportunity to see Socrates naked, another deformed body next to his own beautiful one, a circumstance that would have momentarily but crucially for the course of affairs after the intercourse, separate the body from its qualities. Socrates may thus derive pleasure at keeping Alcibiades waiting *ad infinitum* in order to enjoy his beautiful company and courtship. For it is quite common that men without good looks, like Socrates, resort to power in order to be able to participate in the game of love. Culture, fortunately gives the opportunity to complement nature and is indeed an instrument of power if not sometimes a lethal weapon. Socrates is after all not only

a philosopher but a *δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ*, a demonic man⁵⁰ and a carnal person whose irony consists of maintaining and resolving the insoluble opposition between philosophy and *Eros*. Is Socrates' *Eros* just a mask? Yes and no, says Friedlander, for the mask and the person are particularly intertwined.⁵¹ Repulsion and attraction reign in the hearts of both men who come in this love affair, each with his own assets: Alcibiades with all his natural gifts that allow him to be fragmentary, naïve and frank for he knows that one way or another he will finally be excused. Socrates with his culture, that knows that his participation in the erotic game depends on his absolutely rational conduct, for he is poorly endowed by nature and his culture and its purported inhumanity, according to Nussbaum, is his only means to be finally human. Each is clearly interested in what the other possesses: Socrates' interest in beauty cannot really be doubted and Alcibiades' interest in virtue, wisdom, temperance and justice, in a few words in personal excellence, professed several times during his discourse, ought indeed to be granted to him, even if his motives are not innocent or fully conscious, as Nightingale argues. Both characters are tragic and comic at the same time, for they make the reader want at times laugh and cry.⁵² Laugh, when Socrates and Alcibiades compete for the seat next to Agathon, when in fact they are more interested in each other and disperse the tension created by Alcibiades' confessional challenge to the company, leading the reader to believe that Alcibiades' confession may not have been that frank after all. Cry, out of fondness for human, all too human weakness in love which is so well displayed here in the *Symposium*. Tragedy and comedy is the work of a single person as Socrates instructs Agathon and Aristophanes, not only in words but also in deeds, in the *Symposium*, through his own conduct and his lover's to be, Alcibiades. Each of them have their own unique share in tragedy and comedy, they are in fact both tragicomic, something that Nussbaum fails to observe by emphasizing only their tragic aspects. It follows then that poetry as passage of non-being to being is a process taking us up Diotima's ladder but this creation is no longer deemed to be only positive but may also be negative and does indeed harbor many dangers, that Plato signals elsewhere and notably in book X of the Republic.

Socrates reports how Diotima in the course of their conversation laughed (*ἠ γέλασσα*) (202 b10). I claim that her laugh is rather a giggle. For, if our account of the *Symposium* is correct, Diotima instructs Socrates on all the divine things beyond this world in order that he has a better and more firm footing on the ground of this world. She therefore teaches him the art of seduction, conjured by many divine things. To secure Diotima's claim that happiness means the possession of good and fair things, (202 c10) one ought to have one step in her ladder and the other one on the ground or step up and down her ladder intermittently and this is what Socrates precisely does, more elegantly and purposefully than Alcibiades. He surely has his reasons. I think that this is a fair rendering of both Socrates and Alcibiades in their impossible and yet so compellingly human love affair. They are both comic, i.e. playful and tragic, i.e. serious⁵³ and thus give an indirect but quite forceful lesson to the reader about what creations like poetry and philosophy, heaven and earth, might after all really mean from the perspective of love.

Endnotes

- ¹ Paul Friedlander, *Plato. The Dialogues*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 3.
- ² Ibid. p. 33 and Christopher Rowe, "Introduction", *Plato, The Symposium*, ed. and transl. Christopher Rowe, (Oxford: Aris and Phillips, 1998), p. 9.
- ³ We use Benjamin Jowett's translation of Plato in *The Dialogues of Plato*, (Chicago: William Benton and Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952) as well as Christopher Rowe's.
- ⁴ *The Dialogues of Plato*, *ibid.*
- ⁵ Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, transl. Albert Hofstadter, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) pp. 72, 74.
- ⁶ Reported by Paul Friedlander in *Plato. An Introduction*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 137.
- ⁷ Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher, *Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, transl. William Dobson, (New York: Arno Press, 1973), p. 278. Friedlander agrees with Schleiermacher's assessment. See Friedlander, *Plato. The Dialogues*, *op. cit.* p. 28.
- ⁸ We side with Charles H. Kahn who argues that "What the lover aspires to is creativity: birth in beauty, both of the body and of the soul" but disagree with him when he claims that "the theory of *eros* in the *Symposium* is ultimately a theory of rational desire for the good understood as the good-and-beautiful" for, in my view, it is also a theory of love as the impulse of creation. See Charles H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 269, 264.
- ⁹ Schleiermacher, *op. cit.* p. 280.
- ¹⁰ Friedlander, *Plato. The Dialogues*, *op.cit.* p. 30.
- ¹¹ Robert G. Bury, *The Symposium of Plato*, second edition, (Cambridge: Hetter and Sons Ltd, 1973), p. xlvii.
- ¹² Andrea Wilson Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the Construct of Philosophy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 127.
- ¹³ Pierre Hadot, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p. 71.
- ¹⁴ Ibid. p. 74.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. p. 81.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. p. 81-82.
- ¹⁷ Bury, *op. cit.* p. li.
- ¹⁸ Gregory Vlastos, *Socrates. Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 35.
- ¹⁹ Bury, *op. cit.* p. xxxiv.
- ²⁰ Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1973), p. 189.
- ²¹ Nightingale, pp. 120-121.
- ²² Ibid. p. 116.
- ²³ Ibid. pp. 112, 113, 127.
- ²⁴ Reported by Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, updated edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 195.
- ²⁵ A. E. Taylor, *Plato. The Man and his Work*, London: Methuen & Co, 1978, in modern Greek *Πλάτων. Ο άνθρωπος και το έργο του*, μτφ. Ιορδάνης Αρζόγλου, γ' ανατύπωση, Αθήνα: MIET, 2003, σελ. 276, 277.
- ²⁶ Nussbaum, *op. cit.* p. 184.
- ²⁷ Vlastos, *op. cit.* p. 44.
- ²⁸ Nussbaum, *op. cit.* p. 176.
- ²⁹ Ibid. p. 180.
- ³⁰ Ibid. p. 183.
- ³¹ Ibid. p. 184.
- ³² Ibid. p. 195.
- ³³ Ibid. p. 199.
- ³⁴ Ibid. p. 190.
- ³⁵ Ibid. p. 175.
- ³⁶ Ibid. p. 167.
- ³⁷ Ibid. p. 185.
- ³⁸ Ibid. p. 187.
- ³⁹ Ibid. p. 190.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 194.
- ⁴¹ Ibid. p. 197.
- ⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 198.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 198.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates* ed. and transl. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 51.

⁴⁹ Vlastos, op. cit. p. 31.

⁵⁰ Bury, op. cit. p. lx.

⁵¹ Friedlander, *Plato. An Introduction*, op. cit. p. 139.

⁵² Friedlander reports that the *Symposium* is sometimes called a comedy. See Friedlander, *Plato. The Dialogues*, op. cit. p. 32.

⁵³ Rowe, op. cit. p. 11.