

The European Union Assessed from a post-Nietzschean, 'New Aestheticist' point of view

*by
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1. Introduction: Europe Today

Trade and economy have been the core 'business' of the European Union since 1955, when representatives of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands gathered in Messina to sign the 'Messina Declaration'. That declaration listed an agenda for the European formation, based on the aims '[...] to preserve the standing which she [Europe, MP] has in the world, to restore the influence and her prestige, and to improve steadily the living standard of the population'.¹ In addition, it said that the signing countries 'are of the opinion that these objectives should be achieved first of all in the economic sphere [...]' and '[...] believe that the establishment of a united Europe must be achieved through the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the gradual harmonization of their social policies.'²

This economic conception of 'Europe'³ was sustained by the Lisbon-strategy of 2000, by way of which European leaders committed for the EU to become, between 2000 and 2010,

[...] the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth [...].⁴

This instrumentalist and economic view of knowledge not only confirms Jean Lyotard's analysis that knowledge 'is and will be produced in order to be sold'⁵, but is also typical of a general trend in the creation of Europe's Union today. This, namely, above all propagates Europe as a market, where Europeans move around as

consumers, and where cultural value is increasingly judged by its monetary gain. Anthony Pagden (2002) therefore justifiably observed:

“Europe” now exists as an economic, and increasingly political, entity.
But this has no wider cultural or affective meaning.⁶

In the economic-political conception of Europe, European culture, as the totality of artistic and scientific achievements, is hardly taken into account as something worthwhile for its own sake. This is a significant difference with the pre-modern ‘eudaimonist’ view of knowledge and culture, which held that art and knowledge were treasurable in themselves rather than because of their retail price. Today, a new ‘Golden Age’ is anticipated for Europe, to result from a strong Euro, which in turn is strengthened and stabilized by up-to-date technical knowledge. In this, the role of European politics is virtually limited to the legitimization of this economic approach in treaties and laws. Art, truth, and culture are not assigned any role at all in the process of European unification. In so doing, however, the European Union misses out in achieving true intercultural relations.

This makes it all the more interesting to turn to the nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). In great contrast to the present economic and political view of Europe, Nietzsche embarked a cultural war, claiming that Europe needed not so much economic welfare and political power, but the re-union of art and truth in order to vindicate the prevalence of politics. Or, to put it differently: to take a more aesthetic view of man and culture.

In this paper, I want to clarify Nietzsche’s pleas for the ‘aestheticization’ of European culture and ‘dynamic interculturalism’ as means to achieve true culture for Europe. I do so by, first, outlining its anti-political context; second, by way of discussing the cultural war as it comes to the fore in *The Birth of Tragedy*, third, examining the figure of ‘the good European’, which is key to Nietzsche’s ‘dynamic interculturalism’, and, lastly, by proposing a revitalization of Nietzsche’s thought as a ‘New Aestheticist’ perspective on Europe. This leads me to the conclusion that completing current debates on Europe with aesthetic and cultural debate helps the bridging of cultures and thus the success of the European Union more effectively than a merely economic-political approach.

2. Nietzsche's Cultural War against the Politicization of Europe

In his days, Nietzsche regarded Europe as a culture, which was threatened by politics rather than furthered by it. In fact, he pleaded for Europe as an artistic culture against the political-military conception that gained ground in his day. He set out to fight a 'cultural war' ('Kulturkampf') together with Richard Wagner against both the political-military view of nations and cultures *and* against the amusement- and information-society, which dominated European cultural life. As Nietzsche expressed his anti-political position on several occasions: 'State' ('Reich') and 'spirit' ('Geist') must be kept as remote from each other as possible.

Nietzsche conceived of Europe primarily as an artistic culture, by which I mean a culture whose unity, depth, and 'height' was measured by its artistic spirit and productions. To him, Europe drew its identity from its artistic styles, as they had dominated the outlook of, for example, Greek Antiquity and Italian Renaissance. The artistic and aesthetic approach to European culture formed the basis of his, at first, *national*, and then *cosmopolitan* view of Europe, which he explicitly contrasted to the politicizing and militarizing nationalism of his day. Already rather early (seen from our era at least) it was clear to Nietzsche that '*Europe wants to be one*'.⁷ This was a reason more for him to condemn the 'nationalist nonsense' ('*Nationalitäts-Wahnsinn*'), which provoked a 'politics of dissolution'.⁸ Nevertheless, he was confident that this was 'only *entr'acte* politics' ('*nur Zwischenakts-Politik*') and that the union of Europe would become a fact after the end of this national madness. Despite his conviction that 'Europe' would become a political reality, Nietzsche detested politics throughout his life, and always approached Europe aesthetically in the first place. As he wrote in an early letter to his close friend Erwin Rohde about his housemates in Leipzig: '[...] to my comfort there is *hardly* any talk of politics, for I am not a ζῶον πολιτικόν [zoön politikon], and I have a porcupine nature against such things'.⁹

Culture, in Nietzsche's ideal, is the place where human beings can be truly human beings and to him that is only possible at the moments that human beings are no voting mob, church-goers, or perhaps even adults. Concerning his philosophy of culture, therefore, the exclusive opposition of culture and state, aesthetics and politics, is crucial. True culture can only happen in humanity's *artistic* responses to the world;

true human beings give an aesthetic style to their deep, tragic knowledge in semblance – as the tragic *Greeks* did, according to Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872). There, pre-eminently in its last ten chapters, Nietzsche claimed that the composer Richard Wagner would bring about a new ‘great *Renaissance*’¹⁰ for Europe by rejuvenating this old, tragic and aesthetic, Greek spirit. By supplying Europe with artistic and metaphysical depth in an artform in which art and truth were re-united (after having been separated by Plato and Socrates, who confined truth to the domain of logical reasoning and disallowed artists from making truth-claims), Europe would be saved from all ‘philistine’¹¹, non-aesthetic, unartistic dimensions that even ruled art itself (in Italian opera, above all, according to Wagner and Nietzsche). Musical-technically, this came down to the optimistic belief that culture would be saved by Wagner’s achievement of enriching Beethoven’s symphonic heritage with myth.

Wagner, thus, would resolve the *aesthetic* problem Europe was confronted with, in a time when aesthetics and metaphysics, art and truth as the cornerstones of humanity and culture, were snowed under by politics and the public delight in military war and the amusement of Italian opera [which is originally a true Renaissance art! MP]. Nietzsche’s *cultural* hope amounts to, as he writes in *The Birth of Tragedy*, the hope ‘that music will have a Dionysian future’ in order for a ‘tragic age’ to come.¹² This tragic age vindicates ‘Modernity’. Now what does Nietzsche exactly mean by ‘Modernity’? The problem of Modernity and the need for the tragic is discussed most significantly in chapter 18 of *The Birth of Tragedy*. Modernity, on his account, is the age in which the Gordian knot of Greek culture is untied. According to Nietzsche, Socrates untied the Gordian knot of Greek culture. Hence, modernity began already with Socrates’s trust in logical reasoning and his rejection of art as expression of truth. Rather than equating Modernity with the emergence of information society, as for example his friend Richard Wagner did, Nietzsche understands the start of Modernity as the moment that *three* things happened; first, art and knowledge were separated; second, the truth became a matter of logical deduction; and third, art was judged *morally*. To Nietzsche, Socrates personalizes this moment where the tragic age of the Greeks ended, and he therefore baptizes ‘Modernity’ as the period in which ‘Socratism’ rules.

Inversely, we may infer that the ‘tragic’ age after which he aspired, was the age in which art and truth were united, and where the truth was not something

obtainable by logical deduction, but only by *artistic* or *aesthetic* revelation [here Nietzsche is highly Romantic of course! MP]. Moreover, in the tragic age, art was judged *purely aesthetically*. Information society, to Nietzsche, is only the last convulsion of the long reign of the ‘Socratic’ spirit.¹³ Hence, Modernity or ‘Socratism’ stand for ‘the discordance of art and truth’ – to borrow Jay Bernstein’s words.¹⁴ The characteristic of Modernity, we may say – again with Jay Bernstein -, is ‘aesthetic alienation’, meaning the dismissal of art from the centre to the borders of society and the forbiddance for art(ists) to participate in the truth. More specifically, therefore, Socratism starts with Plato’s *Republic*, in which the truth is installed as fundament of society, while at the same time this truth is made the domain of philosophical (that is, dialectical) reason, and artists are considered as ‘strangers’. By contrast, Nietzsche searches for a culture in which the artist is no longer a stranger. This then would be a ‘tragic’, or, as I prefer to say, tragic-aesthetic, culture.

3. *The Good European*

The Birth of Tragedy is motivated by the expectation that Richard Wagner’s music-drama would lead Europe out of cultural decadence due to the fact that it was a ‘Greek’ form of art, meaning that it re-united art and truth and thus vindicated Modernity. Richard Wagner would conduct Europe out of ‘the jungle of paradise lost’ and spawn ‘the great Renaissance’. Remarkably, around 1885, when Nietzsche rewrote the *Human all too Human* books, the ‘will for Renaissance’ still formed the hope of Nietzsche’s philosophy of culture. Then, however, he considered the Renaissance to consist in the *amalgamation* (*Verschmelzung*) of the European nations into one, united Europe which would be inhabited by a ‘mixed race’ of ‘good Europeans’.¹⁵ This ‘united’ Europe is a Europe for ‘free spirits’¹⁶, who keep remote from politics¹⁷ and dedicate themselves to the former *German* task of making European culture the ‘*continuation of the Greek*’.¹⁸ In this ability to become Greek, Nietzsche declared in a late *Nachlass* note, ‘resided (and always resided) my hope for the German soul!’.¹⁹ Although at that time he considered his former Wagnerism a matter of youthful ‘self-blinding’²⁰, he still assigned a special role to the Germans in the achievement of this renaissance.²¹ He still hoped that the Germans would be the pioneers of a new European Renaissance. However, this time they would be pioneers not because of Germany’s unique ‘tragic talent’, but rather due to their talent for ‘*de-*

*Germanization*²² and for incorporating foreign elements²³. The renaissance, Nietzsche then understood the matter, had to be generated not so much by closing off from French taste and Italian formalism as with the help of ‘our good will, our patience, our fair-mindedness and gentleness with what is strange’.²⁴ Yet still for the reason that ‘*that* is Greek’, to Nietzsche. To be ‘Greek’, then, means to learn and adopt elements from other cultures.²⁵ This idea expresses Nietzsche’s growing ‘cosmopolitan’ spirit, we may say. As he understands now, to be ‘Greek’ was not something unique and metaphysical, but it meant *to transform the self continuously by adopting what is strange*. Or to put it differently, while Nietzsche first opted for a culture in which artists would no longer be considered ‘strangers’, where they would no longer be marginalized and expelled from the realm of truth and social meaning, he now understands that what is strange founds individuality and social dynamics. The figure that tries to be ‘Greek’ in this sense, he christens ‘the good European’.

This idea of learning from other cultures, now, is exactly what Jacques Derrida called ‘*typically European*’. In *L’ autre cap*, he explains that it is ‘typically European way of self-understanding’ to understand that there can be no cultural identity that is ‘identical with itself’ because it is in the nature of a ‘culture that it is not identical with itself’.²⁶ Derrida’s description of European nature is in any case a typically Nietzschean understanding of European man and culture, one that furthermore exceeds politics by employing an aesthetic perspective, a perspective that may still be fruitful in respect of Europe today.

4. Nietzsche’s Aestheticization versus New Aestheticism with regard to Europe today

Nietzsche’s concern for culture amounted to the defence of the ‘aestheticization’ of culture. And it is this ‘aestheticization’ we need today too, I think, with regard to the current unification of Europe. Nietzsche made it humanity’s mission to spread art and the aesthetic view in all directions of life and thereby *affirming* life and *creating* culture. He thus maintained what we may call a *broad* conception of aestheticism, one which not only exceeded the realm of morality, but also those of art and the experience of natural beauty: it sought to bridge and penetrate all domains of life, as Rebecca Bamford (2003) expressed: ‘[...] Nietzsche’s own version of aestheticism is constituted in the deliberate application of aesthetic concerns to non [-] aesthetic situations and arenas’.²⁷ However, we may add to this that his version of aestheticism

also includes the *protection* of the aesthetic sphere against non-aesthetic [e.g. moral, dialectical, and political, MP] intrusion and pollution. Moreover, we must consider that it implies the - Kantian and Schillerian - idea that our faculty of aesthetic judgement must be cultivated, for the simple reason that ‘art and developed judgement are inseparable’, as ‘New Aesthete’ Andrew Bowie (2002) stated, explaining that ‘[...] the abolition of the aesthetic into the attitude of ‘well, it’s what I like’ is the swiftest path to a consumerism [...]’²⁸. It is this philistine, consumerist attitude to art, culture, and life that Nietzsche fought, first in pleading the return of the tragic and then in the embrace and adoption of the ‘other’, of ‘what is strange to us’, expressed in the figure of the ‘good European’.

Nietzsche’s pleas for aestheticization and supra-nationalism form the sort of plea we need today in Europe too. So, at least, I shall argue below in discussion with Thomas Docherty, as the last step of this paper. In his book *Aesthetic Democracy* (2006), Docherty advocates the aestheticization of culture, yet in a way that in my view will not lead to the desired result. Against Docherty, I propose a more Nietzschean concept of aestheticization, as a necessary concept for Europe today, that is, to counter the problem of its lack of what Pagden termed a ‘wider cultural or affective meaning’. Discussing the ‘idea’ of Europe in the same book as Pagden, J.G.A. Pocock explains:

[...] we, apparently, are committed to the submergence of the state and its sovereignty, not in some pan-European or universal confederation, but in a postmodern era in which the global market demands the subjugation of the political community and perhaps of the ethnic and cultural community also; we are to give up being citizens and behave exclusively as consumers. This is why the European Union is ineffective as an empire.²⁹

With Pagden and Pocock, I share the diagnosis of present Europe as a culture dominated by the mercantile spirit, which turns its citizens into consumers and slackens any possible wider cultural or affective meaning. To Pocock, politics capitulates for the consumerist spirit, a spirit, as I pointed out by referring to the Messina declaration and the Lisbon strategy, which was protected and furthered by politics in the first place. I would say, in line with Pocock, that the role of politics is virtually limited to the legitimization of the economic and technocratic unification of

the European states in treaties and laws. The disquieting thing is not only that politics disregards the cultural, but also that politics seems to be fine with the erosion of the role politics used to have and agree with its confinement to administer and facilitate the consumerist spirit. Thomas Docherty (2006) claims a similar position, when he states that politics in Western democracies have become victim of their own politics. If I understand him well, he holds that in furthering the consumerist spirit, politics has given up its defining moment, that which makes politics political in the first place. His solution is to redefine ‘democracy’ and thus return to it that moment which separates it from consumerism. In order to counterbalance the consummation of politics in – what he calls – ‘mercantilism’, he proposes a new definition for ‘democracy’ [as the politics of the Western World, MP], one that includes a moment of aesthetics.³⁰ Docherty thus describes *and* pleads for an understanding of democracy as inherently aesthetic. A democracy is always an ‘aesthetic democracy’, he argues, because, by definition, democracy includes the operation of a moment of exclusion and openness provided by the aesthetic within the political, public realm: ‘[...] it is the aesthetic determinants of a given social formation that enables us to be political beings at all’.³¹ In so doing, however, Docherty basically puts New Aestheticism and New Philistinism together, that is, the post-Kantian and post-Nietzschean position that says that the aesthetic transcends the social, and the post-Marxist position that holds that the aesthetic is always already socially defined. His understanding of ‘aesthetic’, of ‘democracy’ and of ‘culture’, eventually leads to the reduction of ‘culture’ to ‘democracy’, and of ‘democracy’ to ‘aesthetic democracy’. There is, I think with Schiller, Nietzsche, and Adorno, a difference between political freedom and aesthetic freedom. My main objection to Docherty’s ‘Aesthetic Democracy’ is that it keeps to politics as much as the current debates on the European Union do. Docherty uses politics to safeguard aesthetic practices against free-market thinking. In so doing, he makes the same mistake as European politics currently make when employing politics to promote and sustain economy; in their very core, both use politics to safeguard their own interests.

A more antagonistic view such as kept by Nietzsche, but also by ‘New Aesthetes’ as Andrew Bowie, may, at face value, appear hostile and the product of political scepticism. However, in my view it opens up possibilities for politics too. In engaging in the process of aestheticization, it could gain a new – or actually its old – Aristotelian

meaning as the praxis that engages in the forming of a society in which human beings can pursue the good life and develop their human potency at full scale.³² Referring to Aristotle's definition of politics, one could argue that European politics in its constricted focus on economic welfare and interpretation of 'freedom' as 'freedom of choice' puts justice and democracy at stake. This is what I, rather controversially, would hold with Thomas Docherty, including the proposition that aesthetics are needed for European politics to solve this serious problem.

If politics wants to bridge the gap between the political-economic establishment of the European Union and its inhabitants, it should address people aesthetically, meaning as 'total' human beings. While Plato's exclusion of artists from the ideal society created room for modern science and technical reason to emerge, art was directed to the 'mere' realm of aesthetics. Nietzsche's answer was to *broaden* the realm of aesthetics, to push the aesthetic to its limits. With regard to Europe today, I would like to propose the same, because completing current debates on Europe with aesthetic and cultural debate will help the bridging of cultures and thus the success of the European Union more effectively than a mere economic-political approach.

Martine Prange

English abbreviations and translations of Nietzsche's works:

AOM = *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (first part of HH II)

ASC = *Attempt at Self-Criticism* (1886 Preface to BT)

BGE = *Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. Edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Judith Norman, translated by Judith Norman. Cambridge/ New York/ Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2002

BT = *The Birth of Tragedy*. Edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, translated by Ronald Speirs. Cambridge/ New York/ Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999

CW = *The Case of Wagner*. in: Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings*. Edited by Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, translated by Judith Norman. Cambridge/ New York/ Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2005

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- ¹ Cited according to the text established on www.europe.com (website administrated by the European Union until 2005; changed into www.europe.eu in 2006; there the Messina declaration cannot be found in full length anymore. One can find the text on www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl, amongst others). The Treaty of Paris (1951) established the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of the EU.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ The term Europe is generally believed to stem from Greek words meaning ‘broad’ (‘eurys’) and ‘face’ (‘ops’). Others maintain that the name has a Semitic origin, from the Akkadian word ‘gharob’ or ‘erebu’, which is supposed to mean ‘sunset’ (from a Middle East perspective, the sun sets over Europe). Likewise, the name ‘Asia’ is said to derive from the Akkadian word ‘asu’, meaning ‘sunrise’. ‘Europa’ is, of course, also the name of the daughter of Agenor, king of Tyre (Sidon), who was abducted by Zeus. Hence, an Asian woman gave her name to Europe.
- ⁴ Cited according to the text on www.europe.eu (cf. fn 2).
- ⁵ Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 4.
- ⁶ Anthony Pagden, ‘Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent’ in: Ibid. (ed.), *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 33-54, p. 33.
- ⁷ BGE 256, p. 148.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Letter of 17 October 1868 in: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe*. Kritische Studienausgabe in 8 Bänden [KSB]. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag; Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986, Volume 2, p. 331. English translations from the German letters and Nietzsche’s literary remains are all by the author of this text.
- ¹⁰ See Richard Wagner to Nietzsche in a letter of around 12 February 1870. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Briefwechsel*. Kritische Gesamtausgabe [KGB]. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1975ff, Volume II/ 2, pp. 145f.
- ¹¹ ‘Philistinism’ in the Nietzschean sense is ‘the absolute negation of the aesthetic’, as Malcolm Bull put it (‘The Ecstasy of Philistinism’ in: Dave Beech and John Roberts (eds.), *The Philistine Controversy*. London: Verso, 2002, pp. 48-72, p. 51.
- ¹² ‘[...] Tragedy, the highest art of saying yes to life, will be reborn [...]’ (EH, BT 4, 110).
- ¹³ This is ‘Socratic’ serenity, the serenity of the ‘theoretical’ person that threatens all true art. The present state of Socratism is in fact ‘simply the red flush across the evening sky’ (BT Attempt at Self-Criticism 1, p. 4).
- ¹⁴ J. M. Bernstein, *The Fate of Art. Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 1. Bernstein explains Modernity as constituted by the ‘aesthetic alienation’ too.
- ¹⁵ HH I 475, 174-175.
- ¹⁶ HH I Preface, 6.
- ¹⁷ 19[77], *Sämtliche Werke*. Kritische Studienausgabe [KSA.] Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988 (2nd rev. ed.), Volume 8, p. 348.
- ¹⁸ ‘Fortsetzung der griechischen’. HH I 475, 174-175/ KSA, MA I 475, 2, 311.
- ¹⁹ 41[4], KSA 11, p. 679.
- ²⁰ BGE 31, pp. 31-32. See also 42[2], KSA 11, p. 670.
- ²¹ 43[3], KSA 11, p. 703.
- ²² Ibid., KSA 11, p. 702.
- ²³ See for more information on Nietzsche’s philosophy as a plea for ‘Mediterranization’ my: *Lof der Méditerranée, Nietzsches vrolijke wetenschap tussen noord en zuid*. Kampen: Klement, 2005.
- ²⁴ GS 334, p. 186.
- ²⁵ Of course in an agonal, competitive relationship.
- ²⁶ See Jacques Derrida, *L’autre cap*. Paris: Minuit, 1991, pp. 16-17; Cf. Anthony Pagden, ‘Introduction’ in: Ibid. (ed.), *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 1-32, p. 12.
- ²⁷ Rebecca Bamford, ‘Nietzsche’s Aestheticism and the Value of Suffering’ in: Paul Bishop and R. H. Stephenson (eds.), *Cultural Studies and the Symbolic I*. Leeds: Northern University Press, 2003, pp. 66-81, p. 66.
- ²⁸ Andrew Bowie, ‘Another Third Way?’ in: in: Dave Beech and John Roberts (eds.), *The Philistine Controversy*. London: Verso, 2002, pp. 161-174, p. 91.
- ²⁹ J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Some Europes in their History’ in: Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe. From Antiquity to the European Union*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/ Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 55-71, p. 70.
- ³⁰ Cf. Terry Eagleton: ‘[...] how can any political order flourish which does not address itself to this most tangible area [of the aesthetic, MP], of the “lived”, of everything that belongs to a society’s somatic, sensational life?’ (*The*

Ideology of the Aesthetic. Malden/ Oxford/ Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 1990, p. 13). The aesthetic, be it understood as art or the muses or as lust, happiness, leisure, was already defended by Plato and Aristotle, respectively as necessary complement to politics (*Republic* 411 d-e) and ultimate goal of political endeavour (*The Nicomachean Ethics* 1095 a).

³¹ Thomas Docherty, *Aesthetic Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006

p. IX.

³² Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*. Transl. David Ross. Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, I-2, 1-2; X-9, pp. 269-276.