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**The Teary Significance Between the
Aesthetic Experience and the Aesthetic
Phase of Experience: Why is crying over
failure beautiful?**

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In this study, we introduce our cognitive model for the aesthetic experience, created through a comparison of Dewey’s terminology and empirical research from cognitive psychology. We feel Dewey made an invaluable contribution to potential objective research of the Aesthetic experience in his movement away from semiotic theories toward an insistence on the viewer’s perceptual movement from the everyday state of “recognition” to one of “perception”—concepts that can readily be translated into existing psychology. Further, he was indeed correct when he articulated the distinction between "esthetic" experience and "the esthetic phase of experience." It is the interplay between these local aspects within a global experience; between one peak of “disinterested” perception and resulting intellectual reassessment that may hold the key for understanding the aesthetic experience and its effect on the individual.

We will attempt to use his key terms as road signs; to tease apart the separate elements of this process and offer overlooked landmarks for identification. We will show that Dewey’s “movement” from recognition to perception cognitively reflects the interplay between a viewer’s expectations for control of the environment and perceived reality. While success may induce the viewer into heightened states of attention—the "aesthetic phase of experience," we argue, that it is failure that may be most important for an understanding of aesthetic experiences. Most importantly we argue that the cognitive reassessment that may *follow* a discrepant encounter and the culmination in a “new organization of feeling, attention, or intentions,” resulting from what can be considered a failure to understand art, can be understood as a change in the viewer’s self image or identity, and most interestingly, is often marked tears. By comparing this model to recent experiments we conducted in the weepy Mark Rothko chapel, we offer evidence for this experience, and a final discussion of the specific cognitive change resulting from a teary aesthetic experience.

Introduction

Psychology, especially the study of cognition, has much to offer traditional aesthetic theories of experiences with art. So-called aesthetic experiences have long been a favorite topic of both psychologists and philosophers. While each group has developed its own specific terminology and techniques, it is the contention of the author that typically the conclusions from both camps are quite similar. When philosophers speak of “aesthetic” experiences, psychology speaks of “peak” experiences or “flow” experiences. When

Dewey speaks of a "reconstruction," psychology speaks of "self change." Because of its wealth of empirical evidence, psychology can begin to lend much needed direction and refinement for theories of aesthetic experiences, most importantly clarify what that term might even be referring to.

We will begin to look at the major events reported to be part of "aesthetic" experiences, from their cognitive aspect, and begin to talk about how they might fit together, and in what sequence they might occur; as well as why they might occur or what they may lead to. This paper strives to offer a framework, grounded in cognitive study but treating both psychologists and philosophers as equally keen observers, for the observations of the past. In order to accomplish this feat, we briefly introduce a cognitive model for interactions with the environment.

A model for interactions with art

Our experiential model was developed with the express purpose of interpreting and anticipating complex effects from art interactions. It was developed through a comparison of critical interpretations of art-experiences, as well as similar psychological views from cognitive psychology.

Interactions with stimuli in the environment can be roughly broken down into four events: pre-expectations, classification, control, and outcome states. While our explanation of this model will be quite simplistic here, it will allow us to discuss the global qualities of the various relationships to artifacts that have been deemed "aesthetic." Specifically, this model allows us to view interaction as a sequence of cognitive events, beginning and ending with the personal psychology of a specific viewer. It is this combination of the hypothetical viewer, in reaction to an artifactual stimuli, that might allow us shed some clarity on the various elements of the AE.

First, before entering into a specific artifactual encounter, an individual already possesses a set of beliefs and expectations for interacting with the environment. This includes the "fundamental" meanings regarding themselves, other persons, objects or behaviors," "the level of one's self-esteem," "the beliefs one holds that affect self-evaluation," or what together might be called the "self-image."² It is important to note that whatever follows, a viewer's actions are determined by this self-image. Upon encountering a specific artifact, a viewer proceeds to subconsciously classify that object based upon these previously held strategies. Once the object has been assigned a class for interpretation, the viewer then moves into what we call the "control" stage whereby he attempts to interact with the artifact to fulfill whatever purpose is expected from that class of artifact. In the case of artifactual human communication, this primarily involves assessing the meaning of the artifact. The viewer attempts to combine all available information into one coherent dialogue, using the assumed artifactual class and one's pre-expectations as a frame guiding this process. The viewer may also formulate an appropriate response; either respond with his own semantic retort in the case of two way communication, or respond physically, clap, cheer, nod appreciatively and walk away to the next painting etc.

It is at this point that two outcomes might occur, broadly defined as success or failure. Typically, this process of interpreting reality based on one's pre-expectation is reasonably successful. The mostly subconscious process goes smoothly, the viewer's expectations and initial classification are sufficiently confirmed by the perceived reality, and the viewer can be said to have successfully "used" or navigated the artifact. The viewer

attends to the features of the object that are important for its understanding and implementation, and in turn, nothing eventful happens. This encounter, among myriad others, blends into the typical flow of everyday life—the object indistinguishable from its utility.




Figure 1: A cognitive model of art interaction

This process might itself be said to be aesthetic, following the ideas of Muelder-Eaton or Fenner: where one employs an “aesthetic” frame of reference, or classification strategy, for interpreting an object and in turn attends to those qualities that could possibly be agreed upon as aesthetic properties.³ However, it becomes clear from a review of the literature that when philosophers, and psychologists, talk of aesthetic experiences they

quickly lose interest in these quotidian encounters and shift their gaze from the pre-attitude one employs toward the inherently sexier physiological issues of the *experience* itself. Specifically those experiences that stand out from among everyday encounters. Even those philosophers who remain loyal to aesthetic attitudinal forms of assessment readily join the chorus of others when they note that it these rare experience that "breaks in upon us"⁴; the "intense, complex, and pleasurable"⁵ "check of our daily activities"⁶; the "perfect moment,"⁷ sufficient in itself, "which so sweeps everything else into it that all else is forgotten"⁸; or the "consummation" leaving us "uplifted"⁹, transformed and enlightened¹⁰, the rapture and the tearful pleasure¹¹, that demands an explanation. And while philosophers and researchers are yet to agree on what or why it is, or even the meaning of the term aesthetic, there is surprisingly a semblance of consensus regarding what it feels like to have an aesthetic *experience*.

Two aesthetic outcomes: the experience of success or failure

It is here that the model discussed in this paper can become useful, because, when one begins to match this plethora of emotional descriptors for outstanding experiences with a cognitive discussion of how an individual might arrive at them, we find not one, but two possible choices for what is being described. Most importantly, often these emotional descriptors, when viewed as indicators of an underlying cognitive process, contain cognitive variables that might very well be mutually exclusive.

Broadly speaking, again we might talk of success or failure. It is typically success in this encounter that is focused upon when discussing the aesthetic experience. An object interaction goes so smoothly and is so successful that philosophers talk of a detached, cool and emotionless, yet pleasurable sense of completely losing oneself in one's interaction with a work, in which one moves past previously held schemas—the "proper tag or label," to a heightened awareness.¹² One sees a work, or a specific portion of a work, fresh, for the first time. This state also has parallels in psychology, where most recently it was coined the "flow" state by Csikszentmihaly.¹³ Described as "a special, detached state of consciousness, in which you are aware only of the moment, of the activity, and of the sheer enjoyment," this state is often linked to the loss of one's self-awareness.¹⁴ Subjects who experience this state "report being in a zone or cocoon, detached from the external environment and any potential external or internal distractions."¹⁵ The state is also commonly accompanied by a feeling of "deep but effortless involvement."¹⁶ Everything seems to fall into place; perception becomes "unified" and easy. Williams reports that subjects "experience themselves as being on automatic pilot and are able to react effortlessly and with little if any forethought."¹⁷ The state is described as sufficient in itself, "in which behavior occurs smoothly, with no thought at all being given to the question of whether the outcome of the behavior will be as desired."¹⁸ Finally, once this experience ends, the perceiver is typically deposited back into the stream of everyday life, stimulated but without an understanding of how to duplicate the experience.

That the aesthetic phase of experience has received the lion's share of attention from both aestheticians and psychologists is not surprising. Although Csikszentmihaly stresses that this experience can have multiple levels of intensity, in art and philosophy it is most often associated with intense once-in-a-lifetime enlightenment-like experiences. In accounts ranging from Xerxes to Kandinsky it is the fleeting, irreproducible, indescribable nature of this state, likened to transcendence or a religious epiphany that makes it important.¹⁹

Augustine laments, "if only it could last, and other visions of a vastly inferior kind could be withdrawn! Then this alone could ravish and absorb and enfold in inward joys the person granted the vision."²⁰ Dewey too notes this event, which "so sweeps everything else into it that all else is forgotten."²¹

However this intense encounter—"experience heaped upon experience," Csikszentmihalyi flow state, Maslow's "peak experience,"—was considered by Dewey to be but only one portion of the aesthetic experience. Dewey offered, in a short redress to one of his critics, that this phenomenon of peak performance in the cycle of classification and control should be thought of as an "esthetic phase of experience" and distinguished it from an "aesthetic experience" proper, which he considered to include not only an encounter with a stimulus, but the resulting "conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close," going so far as to stress that experience only becomes aesthetic in this "consummatory phase."²² He stressed that it was this entire process of tensions resulting in a "new organization of feeling, attention, or intentions" in the perceiver, the prolonged set of cognitive steps, that Dewey classed as *the* "aesthetic experience."²³ And, most importantly, it was this final re-assessment, occurring within the perceiver, this critical or intellectual portion of the experience that held the greatest significance. However, I would argue that when one studies the typical peak experience cognitively it becomes clear that several steps are missing from the typical discussion which would allow us to reconcile the flow of peak experience with the reassessment in Dewey's aesthetic experience. It is in the criticisms often charged at this form of experience, when analyzed in tandem with their cognitive signifiers, that we can begin to see a distinction between the aesthetic phase of an experience and aesthetic experience.

Shortcomings of the aesthetic phase of experience

The reported loss of one's self in one's activity is the most important feature for discussing this aesthetic phase. Loss of self becomes important for two reasons. First, cognitively, this loss of one's self might be said to signal the lack of discrepancy between one's expectations and reality. It is discrepancies in a perceiver's everyday routine that act as "checks" to his flow of perception, causing him to stop and evaluate his previous actions. Duval and Wicklund note that to the extent that the person examines his performance and evaluates himself—in other words is self-aware—he cannot devote his attention to the task at hand.²⁴ In flow experiences, however, one's classification is so perfect, or so "disinterestedly" broad, that one can happily become lost in processing the object of perception.²⁵ This is important cognitively for two reasons. First without a discrepancy, it is guaranteed that the viewer will find in the object of his perception exactly what he sought. "One acts. Something happens which is taken up as feedback."²⁶ Leder et al. note "exposure to art provides the perceiver with a challenging situation to classify, understand and cognitively master the artwork successfully."²⁷ Csikszentmihalyi notes too that in the flow state it is this successful "exercise [of] a sense of control over... actions" that is important.²⁸ However, successful control implies that one's pre-expectations, strategies for perception and classification, have been successfully verified in one's encounter. Csikszentmihalyi notes that this feeling of pleasurable effortlessness requires that the action or the stimulus be just challenging enough so that the perceiver is pushed beyond a normal response, but not so challenging that he give up the interaction.²⁹

This is not to say that one cannot fine tune one's pre-attitude through training to disregard "practical concerns"³⁰, or cannot be caught off guard by a sudden stimulus and apply a classification strategy that leads to novel results, but it means that no new discoveries can be made that the viewer was not already prepared to perceive. No matter how disinterested or how far removed from utilitarian concerns one's attitude toward a work, it is still a case of classification, based upon one's pre-attitude, that allows for certain aspects to be perceived at the expense of others. If this classification is successfully matched to perception, as it appears to be in flow experiences, no new perception cannot force its way into the viewer's awareness. Dewey made it clear that this tuning of pre-attitude to perception, what he called "recognition" was not the aesthetic experience. He stressed that it is rather the re-assessment within the viewer, the construction of a "new organization of feeling, attention, or intentions," and its culmination in what he called "perception" that lent an aesthetic label to experience, and it is here, by focusing on a viewer's psychology, that his theory offers something new for study on the aesthetic experience.³¹ We would argue that the peak experience cannot mean anything other than an object of perception fitting a category, no matter how aesthetic, no matter how pleasurable—it cannot signify anything other than successful control of an artwork. In fact both philosophers and psychologists have noted that it is the very intrusion of discrepancies in this peak experience that can "shock" us back to ourselves.³² It is the "sudden halt to progress that such obstacles create that causes people to stop," which in turn jars the subject out of the experience.³³ And therefore this portion of aesthetic discussion seems to lie in irreversible contrast to those discussions, including Dewey's—who shares much of the confusion with his fellow colleagues, that stress the intellectual, transformational and developmental character of the aesthetic experience, as well as those that speak of emotion, tensions and new discoveries.

This is important philosophically when one considers the transformational or transcendental qualities of the aesthetic experience. The pleasurable loss of self in a peak experience cannot be more than Arendt's "absence of pain."³⁴ "Where the human body... is thrown back upon itself, concentrates upon nothing but its own being alive, and remains imprisoned in its metabolism with nature without ever transcending or freeing itself from the recurring cycle of its own functioning."³⁵ Dewey was quite adamant that this loss of pain or loss of the self is not the aesthetic experience, "Art would not amplify experience if it withdrew the self into the self," he stated.³⁶ However, as Csikszentmihaly states, in pleasurable flow states, this is exactly what occurs. Because "there is little opportunity for the self to be threatened," "the sense of self emerges stronger after the flow experience is over."³⁷ "By providing a familiar symbolic context [the flow state] reaffirms the identity of the owner," rather than forcing the viewer to re-examine himself or his expectations.³⁸ The viewer can be said to exit an encounter as the same person who entered it. This of course leads to numerous philosophers challenging the very possibility of transcendence through art. If aesthetic experience can only reaffirm what we already *know* about the world and about ourselves, it becomes natural to ask with Smith, how can "enlightenment qualify as knowledge?"³⁹ or to follow Petts or McDowell in asking "how can a mere feeling constitute an experience in which the world reveals itself to us?"⁴⁰ If one only considers experiences where no discrepancy is tolerated between our pre-conceptions—what we expect to discover, and our perception, it cannot.

Lastly, the loss of one's self certainly means that this peak experience is open to the charge of hedonism. It becomes impossible to make a distinction between wholesome

and destructive experiences without arbitrarily distinguishing between good and bad activities.⁴¹ Csikszentmihaly and Halton note, "When utility or the "expected pleasure" an object can bring is taken as the ultimate, the doorway to fragmentation is opened, because presumably the only limitations placed on a given utility value are other utilities.⁴²" However, when philosophers focus on the successful matching of expectation to reality as *the* aesthetic experience, they are left with little more than pleasure as an outcome.⁴³ This line of insight allows art to be nothing more than a "pleasant or useful plaything."⁴⁴ There is no other criteria or outcome that can be used for evaluating experiences with art. Art may become a social opiate, a dangerous form of escapism, and ultimately provide the *wrong* kind of transcendence from reality.⁴⁵

The flow state then, does not provide a suitable answer for art philosophy or art research interested in exploring the possibility of transcendence through art, nor does it provide a good object for empirical research. "Given the unformulability of its rich yet fleeting immediacy..." Shusterman notes, "How are we supposed to measure (let alone communicate) magnitudes of an experience which cannot even be properly defined or marked off for measurement?"⁴⁶

Is there another alternative to this peak experience that can both account for an intellectual element and the act of assessment and personal growth, as well as offer an answer to the problems of escapism and hedonism? Are there other tangible outcomes of art-interaction that can be observed and recorded in a more objective fashion? This solution, I will argue, can only come about through a discussion of discrepancies in experiences with art—through defeat and confusion.

The discrepant aesthetic experience

We feel that it was this emphasis on consummation and critical re-assessment in the personal psychology of the perceiver that was Dewey's greatest contribution to research on aesthetic experiences. It is this re-organization of intentions or expectations, brought about through a process of resistance and tension, what might be called in psychology a "self-change" that might hold great significance for understanding aesthetic relations to art. We would now like to show, by using Dewey as a bridge between psychology and philosophy, how this intellectual component, critical assessment, the "confrontation with value," or the change in self might come about.⁴⁷

Dewey introduced two main concepts that are useful for understanding his conception of the "aesthetic experience." He noted that this phenomenon was the result of a perceiver moving from the state of "recognition" to one of "perception". For Dewey, "recognition" is, "when we experience a thing and interpret it only as something we already know. The act of recognition may be conscious or unconscious, may or may not cause pleasure... it does not produce a new organization of feeling, attention, or intentions."⁴⁸ Recognition, when viewed in terms of its cognitive connotations, is the process of evaluating an object based only on prior assumptions—what the viewer expects to perceive; "falling back on some previously formed interpretive schema or stereotype when confronted with an object."⁴⁹ Further, we note that "recognition" is the act of sustaining or merely modifying an original position despite new-information: explaining discrepant information that contradicts an expectation by expanding the classification.

Dewey's interpretation of the "recognition" state parallels the typical progression from the "classify" to the "control" state in the perception model discussed above. The viewer

is able to classify and then understand some stimulus in the environment—"some detail or arrangement of details serves as cue for bare identification.⁵⁰" In recognition, the viewer is not presented with a discrepancy between his expectation and reality that cannot be assimilated, or the viewer is able to minimize the importance of the discrepancy to such an extent that it is effectively ignored. In this case, the viewer's pre-state—prior expectations, understanding of self—and post-state would not differ. The viewer is not forced to examine his prior expectations or behavior because the interaction proceeded smoothly. Recognition, according to Dewey, "marks a dead spot in experience that is merely filled in" by prior expectations.⁵¹

In "perception," on the other hand, some factor causes the perceiver to "modify previously formed habits or schemes.⁵²" It is this second step the movement from reception to "perception" and the resulting "new organization of feeling, attention, or intentions" that is important for a new understanding of aesthetic experience. Haworth notes that, "Dewey's account stresses... that experience does not consist simply in "having experiences" but includes as well an active aspect.⁵³" We would argue that this active concept corresponds to the ultimate viewer response, the cognitive act of assessment and change as a result of a previous interaction. In the aesthetic experience, when considered via the cognitive ramifications for Dewey's ideas, the emphasis is not on any semantic qualities of the object, or any changes in these qualities, but rather on a culminating psychological change in the viewer. In order to understand this culmination, one must focus not on what an experience means, but rather on how a viewer assesses information and how this can affect them. It is this interplay between "culmination, tension, conservation, anticipation, and fulfillment," all "formal characteristics" of Dewey's aesthetic experience, that becomes important.⁵⁴ Finally, It is discrepancies, between a viewers expectations and the reality of an actual encounter, and the way that these discrepancies tie into the viewer's image of the world that hold the key for understanding this movement between recognition and perception, and more importantly for understanding how a viewer might be moved to change something about themselves.

A cognitive assessment of the movement to perception: the discrepancy

Cognitive discrepancies between one's expectations and reality are certainly an everyday occurrence.⁵⁵ In each case, the discrepancy is discrepant to the extent that it signifies a divide between how one expects to live and act and control the world—their image for an ideal self—and the reality of the present. And in each case, a certain amount of tension or "cognitive dissonance" can be said to arise.⁵⁶ Typically the individual is able to deal with this dissonance either through ignoring the discrepancy or through assimilating the discrepancy into one's classification.⁵⁷ This natural attempt to "to endure it; and to put up resistance to" it seems to coincide with the "suffering" in the attempt at "recognition" in Dewey's parlance.⁵⁸ Particular success in this endeavor may even result in the pleasurable flow state discussed above.

If individuals are confident that the discrepancy can be overcome, or will be explained away later, the individual will wait and attempt to take in more information in order to explain the discrepancy.⁵⁹ Because dissonance is a usual occurrence, it is easier and more efficient to deal with a low level of dissonance than to automatically undergo the cognitive process of changing one's classification or schema.⁶⁰ The individual will continue waiting and perceiving new information until the discrepancy is assimilated into the classification, or until the individual has sufficient evidence that a mistake in

classification has been made. In this case the individual will typically reduce the importance of the object. In the case of artworks, the typical reclassification runs along the lines of the observation, "I can't understand"—i.e. the art is meaningless, and the fault lies with the artist.⁶¹ This act of "recognition" serves to absolve the perceiver from the proceeding interaction, pre-attitude intact.

In cases where the individual believes that all available information about an object has been collected, yet a discrepancy remains, two outcomes may occur. In these cases, as Folkman notes, the subject has "appraised [the] encounter as having to be accepted," yet, often acceptance of the discrepancy, i.e. abandonment of one's pre-expectation, would impact the self negatively.⁶² Typically, "recognition" plays a role here as well. The individual undergoes an attempt to escape from the situation—a "form of coping that allows the person not to focus on the troubling situation."⁶³ Physically, escape can be achieved through leaving the situation altogether, through shutting out the dissonant stimulus—closing one's eyes, or through undertaking an action meant to shift one's attention away from the dissonant cognition—clapping, fidgeting etc.⁶⁴ Mentally, this can be accomplished by raising the importance of the individual's self, or lowering the importance of the discrepant event—"it's only art."⁶⁵ In all cases, dissonance is reduced and with it tension, however, these escape mechanisms do not lead to a true resolution. Escape, by altering the relation between the self and the environment, allows an individual to accept a discrepancy, however it does not lead to a confrontation of the self that might lead to a resolution of the discrepancy. Dewey noted this phenomenon in his observation that recognition represents not the opposite of perception, but rather "perception arrested," halted before a true discovery can be accepted. Rothbaum et al. note that the process of escape exists to protect the self.⁶⁶ The self-identity is protected by covertly changing the environment.




Figure 2: The escape process

Perception

It is only when these escape mechanisms are unsuccessful that the viewer is finally forced to—or able to—confront himself. "The person finally feels free to give up his or her own

attempts to resist.⁶⁷ And as noted by, Efran and Spangler, a second event occurs that allows the viewer to shift from the 'arousal pattern' to a 'recovery pattern'.⁶⁸ This most likely results in a change in the viewer's image of, and expectations for, the world and themselves.⁶⁹ There occurs the cognitive act of acknowledgement of a discrepancy and an acceptance of the fact that one's previous attempt to overcome the discrepancy was unsuccessful—or an acknowledgement of "the actual impossibility to undo what has happened."⁷⁰ One is then able to change one's future expectations for interacting with a stimulus. This change in the self allows for a new non-discrepant relation with the environment. Perception, then, marks the culmination of this long process of "anticipation," "conservation," and "tension," beginning and ending with the unique psychology of a viewer. The entire progression marks Dewey's conception of an aesthetic experience.

The difference between experiences reexamined

There are two factors, then, which stand out in stark contrast to the aesthetic phase of experience. First, whereas peak experiences seem to occur to the extent that the individual is unaware of his self or his actions, the act of self-assessment and acceptance inherent in "perception" seems to demand that the individual be self-aware. There does seem to be psychological data to back the contention that it is self-focus itself that causes an individual to re-assess his expectancies.⁷¹ Steele et al. have suggested that in order to force an individual to give up the typical process of "diminishing or rationalizing... something may have to direct one's attention to oneself to bring their self-esteem resources 'on line'.⁷²" The acknowledgement of an irresolvable discrepancy in the environment is tied to the movement from outward "subjective awareness" to inward "self awareness."⁷³ That is, a discrepancy may only become dissonant when the individual becomes aware of its tie to the self.

Secondly, in the peak experience, which is fundamentally a successful encounter, the environment is made to fit one's expectations, and even in cases where some element does not allow for a satisfactory match between expectations and perception, there is what Dewey called "coerced submission".⁷⁴ "The tensions and resistances are not converted to satisfactory closure," but the interaction is arrested in such a way to preserve the pre-conceptions of the viewer.⁷⁵ In contrast, perception can only come through failure. Irreconcilable discrepancies between one's expectation and the environment force one to "reconstruct" one's expectation in order to later make sense of the environment—"consummation and not a cessation."⁷⁶ "The individual effect[s] his identification with art not by assimilating the work of art to himself, but by assimilating himself to the work."⁷⁷

Tears, a physical sign for psychological change in the self

There is one more wrinkle to this particular outcome of experience. Often this act of assessment, acceptance and ultimate change in a viewer's expectations, the result of a discrepant encounter, is marked by tears.⁷⁸ Miceli and Castalfranchi have gone so far as to explicitly link tears and the aesthetic experience,⁷⁹ while we have extensively documented the parallels between the two theories in previous work.⁸⁰

Tears are "a sign... that point[s] to a cognitive or psychological reorganization."⁸¹ "Crying is a sign that one is allowing oneself to actively experience."⁸² Tears, when considered as an indicator of a self-change in an individual, can be instrumental in research on aesthetic experiences. As noted by Frey, "tears are one of the few aspects of

involuntary emotional expression that provide something concrete to measure.⁸³ By tying tears to self-change tests might be conducted to objectively show this outcome. Tears may provide a means of understanding the difference between "recognition" and "perception"—between "flow" and the "aesthetic experience." Finally, from a philosophical perspective, this "psychological reorganization" in the individual viewer, signified by tears, offers a much-needed alternative to pleasure when evaluating encounters with art. A conception of aesthetic experiences that considers the desired outcome to be those cases where the perceiver, "changes [their] relation to the world in order that the world may change its qualities" opens the possibility for discussions of personal growth and development, as well as the attainment of new knowledge, through aesthetic encounters with the environment.⁸⁴

The Rothko Chapel: a case study in tears

In this last section, we would like to briefly offer some key findings from one case study of this experience conducted at the weepy Mark Rothko Chapel.⁸⁵ Through this study we may begin to offer evidence of the events that occur during one such teary, and discrepant, aesthetic experience. Taking tears to be an indicator for this consummation discussed herein, we would like to briefly explore the questions: what did viewer's expect; what happened; what was the outcome?

The results discussed below are based on a pre-test and a post-test, completed before entering and after exiting, administered to 20 viewers at the Rothko chapel from the 4th to the 7th of October 2006. The test methodology was based on Osgood's "Semantic Differential" form directed at testing viewer's conceptions of art and "themselves," as well as a series 5 point Likert scales, designed to gauge a viewer's pre-attitudes as well as to test emotional effect within the chapel.⁸⁶ All results discussed were significant at the 95% level, unless otherwise noted.

The Mark Rothko Chapel, created by the painter Mark Rothko and opened in 1971 in Houston Texas, stands as a particularly interesting focus for this discussion of aesthetic experiences, self change and tears through unsuccessful meetings between perceiver and artwork. First, the chapel, which consists of an octagonal gallery space containing 14 monumental black and purple paintings arranged on each of the 8 walls, is a point of convergence for teary relations to art. James Elkins claims, "the majority of people who have wept over 20th century paintings" have done so in front of the chapel paintings.⁸⁷ Additionally, a review of the chapel guest book reveals that it is filled with cryptic entries from visitors describing their anxious lack of understanding and confrontations with their own selves: "Being in the chapel is an emotional experience in which you either face your innermost self or leave in incomprehension"; "I don't know what you are asking me!"; "find yourself."⁸⁸

What do viewers expect?

The set of expectations that viewers carry with them into an encounter can range from basic strategies to specific attitudes, but these beliefs and expectations are all tied to what might be called the "ideal self image," the viewer's expectations for themselves and their place in the world. Based upon a review of pre-attitudes, it becomes more apparent how these self-attitudes affect one's interaction with art. Those viewers who cry in the chapel enter with a very specific attitude—some might call it paradoxical—regarding art and themselves that sets them up for failure.

First, for a viewer to be led to tears, it was important that they identified as being comfortable with art. Comfort also entailed the belief that a viewer felt knowledgeable about art. A viewer's specific level of art-knowledge was not important, but rather the belief that they were knowledgeable enough to enjoy the challenge of looking, as well as the ability to enjoy uncontrollable situations. This does not mean that this quality by itself lead to tears. Typically, these viewers also did not have a high desire for control of any situation, nor did they have a high need to find meaning in art. In fact, those viewers who felt comfortable and knowledgeable around art were likely to hold the expectation that they *would not* understand a given work. One might argue that this disinterested or distanced pre-attitude basically precluded the ability to be upset by art, channeling the viewer towards a posterior "recognition" that a given work had indeed been pleurably challenging.

Transversely, the alternative to this position, viewers who felt uncomfortable dealing with art, also generally identified as needing to control all situations. These viewers assumedly viewed art as potentially uncontrollable and therefore threatening, and subsequently showed a set of prior-beliefs that served to protect the self-image in a given art-interaction. This set of attitudes—art is meaningless while artists are "bad"—protects against possible self-threatening discrepancies by diminishing the importance of the potentially threatening stimuli, reducing the value of successful art interaction or control. One would assume that this would greatly affect cognitive behavior in front of actual art. And, after a short and assumedly shallow viewing experience, those viewers who held the pre-attitude that art is meaningless, were likely to end their encounter with the Rothko chapel with the "recognition" or posterior-attitude that art is even more meaningless than before they went in, while the chapel itself made no sense.⁸⁹

The magic combination, those viewers who did not resort to "recognition" or who could not escape from their interaction with their prior expectations intact, seemed to be those viewers for whom art played an integral part of their self-image, as well as, paradoxically, exerting overt control in their daily interactions. Because these viewers had such a high need for control, the Rothko paintings were almost guaranteed to be troubling, however, when a discrepancy did occurred, these viewers, who had a vested interest in their interaction with art, could not simply walk away from their encounter. "The greater the implications for the overall self-image," notes Carver, "the bigger is the potential threat. The person who is trying to control behavior from too high a level will experience a poor performance... as a failure of the self."⁹⁰ These viewers could not dismiss a discrepant work as "only art." A clue for this sentiment is reflected in the artist Fraser's thesis, "Why Does Fred Sandback's Work Make Me Cry?" in which she admits that the "empty" works lead her to admit that art may be meaningless—"and if art is impossible, then artists are also impossible, and I myself am impossible"⁹¹.

Something goes wrong?

In the Rothko chapel, this is exactly what happens. Between a viewer's initial classification of the chapel and their subsequent attempts at guiding their experience to a meaningful conclusion, a discrepancy occurs. This discrepancy is the common thread of critical analyses of the chapel. Elkins notes that the paintings, "start out to be something... and end up being nothing... meaning is what's absent"⁹². Jones notes, "Rothko's murals tantalize us... but there is nothing here"⁹³. Dutoit and Bersani conclude, "Rothko makes a "transcendental promise," but he breaks it and gives us

ourselves, reflected in a darkened mirror⁹⁴." Critics agree that it is the disappointment of a broken "promise," of a viewer left with only "two-dimensional color" that leads to the effects seen in the chapel. Finally, Elderfield adds, "we are reminded that we are alone in front of the paintings⁹⁵." While Nodelman sums up the experience, "[the chapel] forcibly redirects attention to the viewer's situation and conduct... specifies the focus of the viewer's newly evoked self-awareness⁹⁶."



Figure 3: Initial View of chapel interior. Photo credit: www.markrothkochapel.org

The outcome: self change and tears

Those viewers who reported this anxiety but did not cry left the chapel trapped inside their own attempts to protect themselves. They exited feeling that the paintings were "empty," "silly" and "meaningless," while the artist's intention was illegible. Their discrepant interaction caused them to re-evaluate their own selves, as "informal" and "humorous," possibly showing that they were already attempting to diminish the importance of the discrepancy that had just occurred by discounting the seriousness of the entire experience. Finally, they left with a re-evaluation of their self as more "bad" than before they had entered.

On the other hand, 35 percent of viewers did report crying. These subjects too showed correlations in their feeling of anxiety and a need to escape, however, unlike those who did escape, they also reported that they couldn't stop looking, and that they became self-conscious; they reported examining their motives for interacting with the art and changing their minds. Most importantly, they reported a feeling of epiphany and relief and left the chapel feeling that the art was "full" and "meaningful" while the artist's intentions were clear.

This, the distinction between escape and acceptance may be Dewey's "perception." While most viewer's, of those whose pre-attitude was not so disinterested as to preclude the ability to be upset by art, apparently experienced a discrepant loss of meaning at some

point, those who cut their interaction short, and escaped a confrontation with their self, did so at the expense of true understanding. While those who stayed long enough to endure this self-aware epiphany gained new insight into the meaning of the art. This is reflected in the large amount of comments in the visitors' log that stress that the meaning of the paintings is their very lack of meaning—their true significance is their role in forcing one to re-assess what one expects to find. While this version of aesthetic experience was apparently not pleasurable—subjects who cried re-evaluated themselves as more “ugly” and “insincere,” factors that point to a loss of potency, reflecting their previous inability to control their situations—subjects also left changed. They exited feeling themselves to be more “good” than before, while there was some evidence, though not yet statistically significant, that those who found final meaning in the art, after this long discrepant struggle, assessed themselves as ultimately more “beautiful.”

Conclusion

Through a comparison of emotional descriptors of aesthetic experiences and a comparison with cognitive literature, we showed that there may be two distinct events that compete for the title of *the* aesthetic experience. One is based upon the self-less and pleasurable recognition of the environment—a matching of expectation and perception, the “esthetic phase of experience.” The other is based upon failure—a viewer is unable to control an art interaction due to a discrepancy. We argued that these two events, when considered cognitively, might be mutually exclusive. Primarily, this is due to the factor of self-awareness, which allows for pleasurable and successful interactions to the extent that it is absent, while its presence is required for the factors of self-assessment and change to occur. It is this second event, which, rather than being an isolated peak in our daily experience, instead represents a culmination to the sequential *experience* of tension, self-awareness, acceptance and self-change which might correspond to Dewey's “esthetic experience.” This ultimate culmination, marking a change in the perceiver rather than a perceptual change of the environment, when viewed philosophically might shed new insights into the nature of development and enlightenment through art, as well as offer an alternative to pleasure as the only critically accessible outcome from art-experiences. Further, because this event may be signified by the presence of tears, it offers a testable window into the personal psychology of the perceiver. Finally, through a brief analysis of one empirical test of this experience we hoped to begin to show the beauty of this entire experience, representing the complex entanglement of perceiver and environment in the human struggle for meaning. Tearful failure in this regard, may be an important gateway to the beautification of the self.

¹ Dewey, John. “Aesthetic Experience as a Primary Phase and as an Artistic Development.” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 9. 1 (September, 1950): 56-58., see also Dewey, John. *Art as Experience*. Perigree, 1980.

² Steele, Claude M., and Steven J. Spencer and Michael Lynch. “Self-Image Resilience and Dissonance: The Role of Affirmational Resources.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64. 6 (1993): 886., Lawler, Edward J. and Shane R. Thye. “Bringing Emotions into Social Exchange Theory.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999): 228. see also, Morgan, David L. and Michael L. Schwalbe. “Mind and Self in Sociology: Linking Social Structure and Social Cognition.” *Social Psychology Quarterly* 53. 2 (June 1990): 148-164.

³ Fenner, David E. W. *The Aesthetic Attitude*. Humanities Press Int., 1996., Muelder Eaton, Marcia. “The Social Construction of Aesthetic Response.” *British Journal of Aesthetics* 35. 2 (April, 1995): 95-107.

⁴ Fenner, *Aesthetic Attitude*.

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- ⁵ Beardsley, reprinted in Dickie, George. "Beardsley's Theory of Aesthetic Experience." *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 8. 2 (April, 1974): 16.
- ⁶ Ingarden, Roman. "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 21. 3 (March, 1961): 300.
- ⁷ Schoen, Max. "Aesthetic Experience in the Light of Current Psychology." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 1. 1 (Spring, 1941): 23-33.
- ⁸ Dewey, *Art as Experience*. 56.
- ⁹ Muelder Eaton, Marcia. "The Social Construction of Aesthetic Response." *British Journal of Aesthetics* 35. 2 (April, 1995): 99.
- ¹⁰ e.g. Shusterman, Richard. "The End of Aesthetic Experience." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 55. 1 (Winter 1997): 32., and Smith, Ralph A. "Aesthetic Criticism: The Method of Aesthetic Education." *Studies in Art Education* 9. 3 (Spring 1968): 31.
- ¹¹ for example, Maslow notes that his subjects in a "peak" experience report, "This is too much for me." "It is more than I can bear." "It is too wonderful." He further mentions that it "may bring tears." Maslow, A. H. "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences." *The Journal of Genetic Psychology* 94 (1959): 55.
- ¹² E.g. Ferree, George. "The Descriptive Use of "Aesthetic Experience."" *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 2. 2 (April, 1968): 23-35., and Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly and Eugene Rochenberg-Halton. *The Meaning of Things; Domestic Symbols and the Self*. Cambridge University Press, 1981. 179.
- ¹³ Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. *Flow; the Psychology of Optimal Experience*. Harper Perennial. 1990.
- ¹⁴ Norman, Donald A. *Emotional Design; Why we Love (or Hate) Everyday Things*. Basic Books, 2004. 125.
- ¹⁵ Smith, Ronald E. "Performance Anxiety, Cognitive Interference, and Concentration Enhancement Strategies in Sports." Ed. I. G. Sarason, G. R. Pierce and B. R. Sarason. *Cognitive Interference; Theories, Methods, and Findings*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996. 266.
- ¹⁶ Csikszentmihalyi, 49. See also, Shusterman, 29-41.
- ¹⁷ Reprinted in Smith, 266.
- ¹⁸ Carver, Charles S. "Cognitive Interference and the Structure of Behavior." Ed. I. G. Sarason, G. R. Pierce and B. R. Sarason. *Cognitive Interference; Theories, Methods, and Findings*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996. 31.
- ¹⁹ Dillard reports the anecdote of Xerxes who "saw the tree with the lights in it," and forever after looked for, but never found, the same vision. Dillard, Annie. *Pilgrim at Tinker Creek*. Harper and Row, 1988. 88.
- Kandinsky too reports a similar incident. "It was the hour when dusk draws in. I returned home... still dreamy and absorbed... and suddenly saw an indescribably beautiful picture, pervaded by an inner glow. At first, I stopped short and then quickly approached this mysterious picture, on which I could discern only forms and colors and whose content was incomprehensible... it was a picture I had painted, standing on its side against the wall. The next day, I tried to re-create my impression of the picture from the previous evening by daylight. I only half succeeded..." reprinted in Phillips, Glenn and Thomas Crow ed. *Seeing Rothko*. Getty Research Institute, 2005. 145.
- ²⁰ Augustine, Saint. *Confessions*. Trn. H. Chadwick. Oxford, 1991. 172.
- ²¹ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 56.
- ²² Dewey, *Aesthetic Experience*, 56-58.
- ²³ Dewey, reprinted in, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochenberg-Halton, 44.
- ²⁴ Duval, Shelley and Robert A. Wicklund. *A Theory of Objective Self Awareness*. Academic Press, Inc., 1972.
- ²⁵ Mitias claims that this disinterested attitude makes an experience aesthetic: "One assumes an aesthetic attitude when he receives an object disinterestedly, sympathetically, attentively, or put differently, contemplatively. ...I do not allow my own emotional, intellectual, or cultural idiosyncrasies to interfere in seeing, i.e., apprehending, the values pregnant in it." Mitias, Michael H. "What Makes an Experience Aesthetic?" *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 41. 2 (Winter 1982): 167.
- ²⁶ Haworth, Lawrence. "The Deweyan View of Experience." Ed. Michael H. Mitias. *Possibility of the Aesthetic Experience*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986. 81.
- ²⁷ Leder, Helmut, Benno Belke, Andries Oeberst and Dorothee Augustin. "A Model of Aesthetic Appreciation and Aesthetic Judgments." *British Journal of Psychology* 95 (2004): 493.
- ²⁸ Csikszentmihalyi, 49.
- ²⁹ Csikszentmihalyi, 49.

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- ³⁰ Petts, Jeffrey. "Aesthetic Experience and the Revelation of Value." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 58. 1 (Winter 2000): 61-71.
- ³¹ Dewey, reprinted in Csikszentmihalyi and Rothenberg-Halton, 44.
- ³² Ingarden goes so far as to explicitly state this. "The reason for overlooking some details in an aesthetic perception is a different one: the details to be overlooked "shock" us; if they were perceived, they would introduce a disharmonious factor into the field of what is in perception given to us, they would bring discordance into the totality of an aesthetic object." Ingarden, 293.
- ³³ Carver, *Cognitive Interference*, 31.
- ³⁴ Arendt, Hannah. *The Human Condition*. University of Chicago Press, 1958. 112.
- ³⁵ Arendt, 115.
- ³⁶ Dewey, 103.
- ³⁷ Csikszentmihalyi, 49.
- ³⁸ Csikszentmihalyi, 187.
- ³⁹ Smith, 18.
- ⁴⁰ McDowell reprinted in, Petts, 61.
- ⁴¹ Csikszentmihalyi notes this conceptual problem, "the flow experience, like everything else, is not "good" in an absolute sense. It is good only in that it has the potential to make life more rich, intense, and meaningful... But whether the consequences of any particular instance of flow is good in a larger sense needs to be discussed and evaluated in terms of more inclusive social criteria." Csikszentmihalyi, 70.
- ⁴² Csikszentmihalyi and Rothenberg-Halton, 227.
- ⁴³ E.g. Beardsley, Monroe C. "Aesthetic Experience Regained." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 28. 1 (Autumn, 1969): 3-11.
- ⁴⁴ Adorno, Theodor W. *Aesthetic Theory*. Trn. C. Lenhardt. Routledge & Kegan and Henley, 1984. 18.
- ⁴⁵ E.g. Shusterman notes that art can provide "a substitute imaginary realm where our frustrated desires for a happier life and our just demands for a better society [are] displaced, sublimated, and gratified--but in imagination only," Shusterman, Richard. *Pragmatist Aesthetics; Living Beauty, Rethinking Art*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 146.
- ⁴⁶ Shusterman, 56.
- ⁴⁷ Petts, 67.
- ⁴⁸ Dewey, reprinted in, Csikszentmihalyi and Rothenberg-Halton, 44.
- ⁴⁹ Csikszentmihalyi and Rothenberg-Halton, 177.
- ⁵⁰ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 52.
- ⁵¹ Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 24.
- ⁵² Csikszentmihalyi, and Rothenberg-Halton, 177.
- ⁵³ Haworth, 80.
- ⁵⁴ Shusterman, 56.
- ⁵⁵ Festinger notes that, "the existence of dissonance is undoubtedly an everyday condition... Where an opinion must be formed or a decision taken, some dissonance is almost unavoidably created." Festinger, Leon. *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*. Tavistock, 1957. 4-5.
- ⁵⁶ For a discussion of cognitive dissonance see, Festinger, Elliot, Andrew J. and Patricia G. Devine, "On the Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance; Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67. 3 (September, 1994): 382-394. For a discussion of the tie to self-change, Bem, Daryl J. "Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena," *Psychological Review* 74. 3 (1967): 183-200.
- ⁵⁷ Festinger notes, "the quickest and probably the most effective way to deal with the introduction of dissonance... is to misperceive or avoid cognicizing the stimuli." Festinger, 16.
- ⁵⁸ Miceli and Castalfranchi, 254. Dewey, *Art as Experience*, 41
- ⁵⁹ Goethals, George R. and Joel. Cooper. "When Dissonance is Reduced: The Timing of Self-Justificatory Attitude Change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32. 2 (1975): 361-367.
- ⁶⁰ Goethals and Cooper note, "Subjects delay engaging in potential dissonance-reducing procedures until all of the evidence that they expect to obtain becomes available." Goethals, George R. and Cooper, Joel. "When Dissonance is Reduced: The Timing of Self-Justificatory Attitude Change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32. 2 (1975): 362.
- ⁶¹ From notes that the blame typically is assigned to one's partner in interaction rather than with the self. "Such an experience of lack of meaning may result in the subject suddenly realizing that "it is only a film ." ...there is no need to see any meaning in the behavior of the person as perhaps there is no meaning." From,

Franz. *Perception of Other People*. Trn. Brendan A. Maher and Erik Kvan. Columbia University Press, 1971. 99.

⁶² Folkman, Susan, Richard S. Lazarus, Christine Dunkel-Schetter, Anita DeLongis and Rand J. Gruen. "Dynamics of a Stressful Encounter: Cognitive Appraisal, Coping, and Encounter Outcomes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50. 5 (1986): 1000.

⁶³ Folkman et al., 1000.

⁶⁴ e. g. Rothbaum et al., 5-37.

⁶⁵ e.g. Rothbaum et al., 10. Hill and Martin, 33. Hill and Martin, 313., Lerner, Melvin J. and Dale T. Miller. "Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead." *Psychological Bulletin* 85. 5 (1978): 1033.

⁶⁶ Rothbaum et al., 20.

⁶⁷ Miceli and Castalfranchi, 258.

⁶⁸ Efran and Spangler, 64.

⁶⁹ Also called "attitude change" in cognitive literature. e. g. Sarason et al.,

⁷⁰ Miceli and Castalfranchi, 251.

⁷¹ Ingram, Rick E. "Self-Focused Attention in Clinical Disorders: Review and a Conceptual Model." *Psychological Bulletin* 107. 2 (1990): 156-176.

⁷² Discussed in, Wood, Joanne V. and Philip G. Dodgson. "When is Self-focused Attention and Adaptive Coping Response?: Rumination and Overgeneralization Versus Compensation." Ed. I. G. Sarason, G. R. Pierce and B. R. Sarason. *Cognitive Interference: Theories, Methods, and Findings*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996. 246.

⁷³ Duval and Wicklund note, "Subjectively self aware individual focuses his attention outward—toward other people, toward tasks, toward sources of entertainment, and so forth. This would imply that the person's relationship to the environment will be one carrying a feeling of control and mastery, for it is only in objective awareness that he will think about himself as falling short of the ideal of exerting control over the environment." Duval and Wicklund, 5.

⁷⁴ Gauss, Charles Edward. "Reflections on John Dewey's Aesthetics." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 18. 2 (Winter, 1960): 127-132.

⁷⁵ Gauss, 128.

⁷⁶ Dewey, *Art as Experience*. 35.

⁷⁷ Adorno, 125.

⁷⁸ Dewey, *Art as Experience*. 35.

⁷⁹ Miceli and Castalfranchi

⁸⁰ Pelowski, Matthew. *Incontinent Thaumaturgy: Tears, the fetish, and the Aesthetic Experience: A critical-empirical study of viewer affect and the philosophy and significance of the Aesthetic Experience*. Masters Dissertation. Nagoya University, 2007.

⁸¹ Efran and Spangler, 68.

⁸² Bohart, Arthur C. "Toward a Cognitive Theory of Catharsis." *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice* 17. 2 (Summer 1980): 199.

⁸³ Frey, William H. II. *Crying; The Mystery of Tears*. Winston Press, 1985. 106.

⁸⁴ A quote from Satre, quoted in, Lutz, Tom. *Crying; The Natural & Cultural History of Tears*. W.W. Norton & Co., 1999. 240.

⁸⁵ Pelowski

⁸⁶ Osgood, Charles E. *The Measurement of Meaning*. University of Illinois press. 1961.

⁸⁷ Elkins, James. *Pictures and Tears; A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings*. Routledge, 2001. 4.

⁸⁸ Comments from visitors log copied from guestbook by the author on October 4, 2006, also quotes reprinted in, Barnes, Susan J. *The Rothko Chapel; An Act of Faith*. University of Texas Press, 1989. 8.

⁸⁹ For other examples of the effect of diminished expectations on outcome see, Darley, John M., John H. Fleming, James L. Hilton and William B. Swann Jr. "Dispelling Negative Expectancies: The Impact of Interaction Goals and Target Characteristics on the Expectancy Confirmation Process." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 24 (1988): 19-36.

⁹⁰ Carver, 40.

⁹¹ Fraser, Andrea. "Why Does Fred Sandback's Work Make Me Cry?" *Grey Room* 22 (Winter 2006): 30-47.

⁹² Elkins, 17.

⁹³ Jones, Jonathan. "Feeding Fury." *The Guardian* (Saturday December 7, 2002): 8.

⁹⁴ Reprinted in, Elkins, 16.

⁹⁵ Elderfield, John. "Transformations." Ed. Glenn Phillips and Thomas Crow. *Seeing Rothko*. Getty Research Institute. 2005. 112.

⁹⁶ Nodelman, Sheldon. *The Rothko Chapel Paintings: Origins, Structure, Meaning*. University of Texas Press, 1997. 299.