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**“Aesthetic value as reason. The nature,
relevance and limits of aesthetic
agreement”**

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Introduction

The current postmodern scenario shows us a time when pluralism and relativism seem to govern the art worlds; a time when anything could be a work of art, anything goes, anybody could be an artist or a critic. Boundaries and hierarchies in art have disappeared. Post modernity expresses the crisis of modernity. In relation to art, postmodernism completes the process of “de-definition”¹ in which art disappears as a pure and separated domain. At the same time, while aestheticism seems to impregnate daily life, not only many artists but also many influential theorists separate art from aesthetics.

The current pluralism usually reflects relativism and this often motivates the debate about the death of art and criticism. All the hierarchies have been knock down, art is immersed inside a vast, open and tolerant cultural world (although ruled by powerful production and distribution systems) which has offers for everybody’s taste. The potential public for art is then much bigger now, and the institution looks very healthy. However, especially when dealing with contemporary art, the public (the art consumers) often show themselves puzzled, and miss certain criteria of appreciation. These criteria become those of the art world itself (for example, people are guided by the name of the artist). Then they are seen as external criteria not directly related to the internal qualities of the works. In this scenario, aesthetic criteria as criteria for art value seem to be left apart. In this paper, I will argue against this movement and I will defend the relevance of aesthetic value to define and value art.

In fact, the interest in questions about aesthetic experience and judgment has also increased a lot in the last decades (at least, considering the amount of research published). And I think that this could be related to the ambition to look for reasons that value art independently of the market rules and mass media diffusion.

But when considering aesthetic value as an argument relevant to art evaluation, at least three problems will appear. Two of them have been already mentioned: the so called “de-aesthetitation” of much of contemporary art, and the “aesthetitation” of daily life, that would show aesthetic value irrelevant or secondary for artistic evaluation. But there is also the extended view about the subjectivism of aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic evaluation, expressed in judgments of *taste*, is usually thought of as a subjective matter, cultural and historically determined. Postmodern era is that of individualism and freedom

to judge and value according to personal taste. Any aesthetic agreement, if possible, would be restrained to a particular group or community.

To look again to concepts like aesthetic experience, judgment, or taste (the problems of the initial philosophical aesthetics on the XVIII century) take us to a new attempt at showing the rationality of aesthetic evaluation, one that can be legitimately not just shared but argued. An account of this peculiar form of reason would make sense of both agreements and disagreements, on whose relevance and limits this paper reflects. But before doing this I will sketch an account of aesthetic value, based on personal experience however expressed in judgments that claim normativity.

Aesthetic Experience and Values of Art

Without trying to exhaust all the features of aesthetic experience, this could be characterized as the experience that links cognitive activity and affection in such way that the first is valued according to the pleasure it causes.² That is, an aesthetic experience is a cognitive experience in which we pay attention to an object (looking, listening, touching, smelling or tasting) and so we perceive certain properties, but they are affectively valued: they are coloured by an emotion, pleased or displeased. In the aesthetic relation the (dis)pleasure felt by a subject rules the cognition of an object and the cognition of the object is the source of the (in)satisfaction felt by the subject. This characterization would be the common (aesthetic) nucleon for the enjoyment or deception we feel when, for example, looking at a painting, watching a film or a television show, reading a book, listening to the birds singing, savouring a meal. This is a pragmatic definition that naturalizes the aesthetic experience focusing on the fact that aesthetic properties involve the response of a subject that perceives, recognizes and feels (and reflectively sees himself as subject of these activities).

Aesthetic experiences are then very different depending on their object and content, but they are all intentionally directed at an object (or certain aspects of it) employing our cognitive powers –following Kant- in a different and specific use. According to Kant, the disinterest demanded by the aesthetic attention engages our cognitive powers in a “free play” that gives us pleasure. For Kant, this kind of pleasure was the key to claiming the universality of aesthetic judgment, and especially for the autonomy of aesthetic experience from, not just the ordinary sensitive pleasures or utility, but also from science and (instead of being indirectly connected) from morals. It’s true that the notion of “disinterest” has formalist connotations which, when defining art, reduces the value of art itself. And there is also an ideological side of an aesthetic attitude defined as the lack of interest in the practical uses of the object. But in spite of the controversy and supporting much of this criticism, I think that disinterest could still be recognized as the hallmark of aesthetic attitude as long as the pleasure we obtain in aesthetic experience arises from our interest in the form of the object and not in its existence or possession. This is after all an interest in the object (as object of contemplation) that proves right those who point to the paradox of the term. However, the interest is in the form or the appearance of the object, in what is specific to representation. This means that aesthetic attention is directed to an object as represented with certain phenomenal properties: the aesthetic object.

Now, these properties are relational, namely, they are meant to be *experienced* by the subjects. But aesthetic properties are not naturally aesthetic; they are not the mechanical response to the physical features of objects. And it is also wrong to understand (as the twentieth-century formalists did) aesthetic experience as merely perceptual: a pleasure

caused by the presentation of certain immediately perceivable properties, singly and in combination. For many of those who, taking into account the cognitive and emotional effects of artworks, thought that the role of art could not be explained solely in terms of pleasure, this was a reason for separating art and aesthetics. Thus I propose –following Alan Goldman- to distinguish between a perceptual and an “experiential” account of aesthetic value.³ This account broadens the notion of aesthetic experience, traditionally thought of in purely sensory terms. Thoughts and emotions are implied along with sensations; such a complete engagement of our mental faculties will be the unique mark of aesthetic experience.

Aesthetic properties being relational, knowledge will affect importantly our capability to pay attention to certain aspects of the objects and to our affective response to them. The intrinsic perceivable properties of two objects might be the same, but our experience of them could differ greatly. This conclusion goes against Danto’s objection that appeals to perceptually indistinguishable objects that however differ in value⁴. According to Danto, whatever transforms (transfigures) an object in a work of art is not a formal property but those that emerge from the theories or practices of the art world. And he was right in noticing the relevance of the theory to appreciate art. As Benjamin Tilghman puts it “...for example, only if a person is acquainted with, say, period styles in art is it intelligible to say that he sees this painting as closer to mannerist tradition than to the baroque”. This is why Tilghman thinks that these cultural conditions do not work, not as casual conditions, but as “conditions of intelligibility” for aesthetic judgment.⁵ Aesthetic properties are relational, partly constituted by our responses. But in Goldman’s words: when we are fully engaged by the aesthetic object we do not simply pay close perceptual attention to it but also bring to bear “one’s cognitive grasp of those external and historical relations that inform one’s aesthetic experience”.⁶

So in aesthetic experience, we do not experience just formal qualities but, arising out of those, also expressive and cognitive content. There is nothing like a *pure* disinterested look at the object; there is no aesthetic judgment without concept.⁷ Some kind of knowledge, including historical and theoretical relevance, informs the aesthetic experience and can make it richer or poorer. Therefore, Goldman is right when claiming that the idea of aesthetic experience is easy to attack when it is impoverished not only by thinking of it in purely sensory terms, but also by equating aesthetic experience with disinterested pleasure derived from the passive contemplation of beauty as the only aesthetic property.⁸ The experiential account of aesthetic value that he proposes can also broaden the idea of pleasure obtained in an aesthetic experience. “Satisfaction” would be –according to Goldman- a better term for describing the positive feeling we derive from exercising our sensitive, cognitive and affective capabilities engaged simultaneously in an aesthetic experience.⁹

Now, can we talk about an experience of satisfaction when much of the avant-garde art are examples of an “ugly” art, employing materials that even look for experiences of disgust? Certainly, aesthetics’ long association with beauty accounts for some theorists’ desire to move the artistic away from the aesthetic.¹⁰ Aesthetic experience –it has already been said- is intentional, focuses on its object. However, in relation to art as a human activity that will keep *artifactuality* as part of the definition of a work of art, we have to point to another kind of intentionality that rests in the production and appreciation of a work. This is the intention of communication and so it should be appreciated. Therefore we can say that for the artistic there is an intention of being significant. Every aesthetic

experience of art will be then a symbolic experience¹¹ where meanings count along with expressive qualities and formal properties. Aesthetic experience is not exclusively perceptual, it is informed and evaluative. Going back to our first definition, cognition and affection are intimately connected, so the representation we make of the objects, including medium, form and content, would be the source of (in)satisfaction. That is why we could say that we get pleasure or satisfaction even from the experience of perceptually repellent works of art that assault our senses, shocks us affectively, and challenge our intellects. The aesthetic distance that allows us to contemplate these works turns positive an experience that in a non artistic context could be unbearable. There is also art that means to be perceptually insignificant; objects (like the famous Duchamp's *ready-mades*) that originally are not artistic objects but when somebody (their "author") exhibits them in certain conditions could be art and could produce aesthetic experiences. Because, again, this art, being true that it does not seem to aim at aesthetic value (traditionally associated with formal beauty), can be valued aesthetically because of the richness and complexity of the experience we get from it and, if the opposite, could fail. But it would be the same for traditional art, where pleasant qualities are not a guarantee of aesthetic value. Thus, in Goldman words, "a work with only formal beauty but lacking other expressive qualities and cognitive challenge is likely to appear shallow because of its failure to produce rich and intense experience" and so lack great value, while "valuable works can fail to be visually or auditorially pleasing".¹²

So, an impoverished and hedonistic notion of the aesthetic experience and pleasure could be responsible for the acclaimed "de-aesthetization" of contemporary art. But, on the other hand, what is important to keep in mind is that in art, being medium and form related to content, even for conceptual art, cognition is directly tied to or dependent upon the perception and that will produce (in)satisfaction.¹³ The idea or discussions that conceptual art aims at being more important than its perceivable aspects, but these are still inevitable and crucial, because they are the artistic media. Conceptual art involves objects and events to be perceived and so experienced aesthetically. Consequently, any art has the potential of being aesthetically evaluated. The aesthetic, in the way just presented, would involve cognition and affection trying to avoid formalism but would keep the idea that essentially ties them to the perceptual.¹⁴

Many have insisted in the distinction between the artistic and the aesthetic arguing that aesthetic function would not be the only one and even not the most important function of art in comparison with others like knowledge, politics, religious, morals or entertainment. And I do not deny that there are many and different values of art, and truths, moral and political lessons of a work of art are surely not necessarily aesthetic values. However, and I follow Alan Goldman again, they also could be so; that is, truths, moral and political lessons can contribute to the aesthetic value when truth or knowledge brought to or gained from an art work is, and only then, "mobilized in the experience of the work".¹⁵ Besides, the point is that while other values of art would not be exclusive (and even better achieved by other means than the artistic fiction), the aesthetic value seems internally related to art since it derives from the experience of the work itself. Due to this internal relation, it seems to me that it would be worthwhile to give again a central role to aesthetic value between the criteria for art criticism.

Now then, against my previous conclusion one might argue that aesthetic experience is not exclusive to art either, and so it cannot work as a criterion for the artistic. True,¹⁶ artistic objects can be seen as a subclass of aesthetic objects but not identical to them.

The avant-garde art production referred to above is non-aesthetic in traditional terms precisely because it tried to wipe away the limits and boundaries imposed on art by ahistorical standards of aesthetic value as well as the social institutions that were seen to support and be supported by those standards. The result is that any object could be a work of art and any object could cause (a very different kind of) aesthetic experiences. The definition of aesthetic experience I started with gives account of the fact that aesthetic experience is, according to the diverse nature of "objects" that which can cause it and the diverse condition of the experience itself, an open concept. But the account I am defending leaves art as an open concept too. Defending aesthetic value as criterion for art criticism does not mean to support a re-definition of art appealing to any dogmatic canons. However, it tries to keep "art" as an intelligible concept, that is, tries to set some kind of boundary between what should and shouldn't be called "art".

To summarize, being greatly diverse in objects and contents, what is distinct in aesthetic experience in art? Any aesthetic appreciation of an object would have in common the simultaneous engagement of our perception, thought, imagination, and feeling. Now, to define something as art from an aesthetic point of view, the experience will take account artifactuality as an artistic intention of communicating or being significant, and would evaluate the richness and depth of the understanding for us, others and the world, that we get when it stimulates our imagination and emotions. Now, if, for example, we compare aesthetic experience in eating with that in art,¹⁷ we could see that although sharing a common nucleon of aesthetic experience, they are on different levels. To use an example of Gerard Vilar, it does not seem reasonable to think that anybody could consider interesting a meal that provokes nausea, while a work of art could be disgusting but great art after all.¹⁸ We could imagine ourselves going back to experience it again and we'll probably find a different challenge. When cooking a meal, the "artistic expression" would be then limited by the requirement of preparing healthy and pleasurable positive food. Meanwhile, as an artist, a cook could create imaginative and fully significant, but surely uneatable meals.¹⁹ On the other hand, when dealing with the so called difference between low and high art,²⁰ we could say that great art typically made us fully engross and exercise our perception, thought, imagination and feeling; so the difference seems to be one of degree in certain aspects of the aesthetic experience in terms of enjoyment and enlightenment. On these lines, when talking about aesthetic experience in art Alan Goldman seems to complement his engagement criterion pointing out that great art works do this by challenging our capacities and producing rich, intense and complex experiences. However, it has been noticed that intensity would not make a proper distinction in this sense, since intense emotions would be felt by people, we'd say, with bad taste.²¹ Some people could intensively appreciate objects that other people would call "kitsch". Therefore, the intensity of the aesthetic experience would not say much about the aesthetic "quality" of an object. In other words, richness and complexity challenging us cognitively and emotionally would be, I think, more successful criteria.

My conclusion is then that aesthetic value, understood as the richness and complexity in the challenge of our cognitive, affective and sensuous faculties in the engagement with an artifact, helps to define and value art. This would be a criterion that focuses on the nature of the experience of the objects not on their ontological nature, leaving "art" as an open concept but trying to qualify artistic objects according to their quality or excellence. But for that criterion to work effectively, other objections should be met: particularly those that point to subjectivism and cultural and historical conditions of aesthetic judgment.

Aesthetic Reasons

Talking about boundaries of art, Benjamin Tilghman affirms that "to say that just about anything can be *called* art, but whether calling can make it so" is "essentially the thesis of institutional theory of art".²² And the institution shows itself quite generous supporting whatever an artist says is art. To call an item art may be no more than to say that it goes in the museum. By contrast, Tilghman suggests to enact a freedom of labeling measure with respect to all the controversial material of recent years and so to set aside all general questions of boundaries turning, instead, our attention to particular cases in which artistic status of a thing is in question. Then the answer would have to give a reason for why something merits being called art. And to do that, Tilghman argues, we should have to look not only to the changing practices of the art world, but also to our reactions to them. So, when we are told that what we are to see is art, we will expect "something that will provide delight or that will be in some way significant".²³

I interpret this as a defense of the aesthetic response as relevant to art evaluation and definition that doesn't ignore the relevance of cultural heritage and the current art world in the matter. According to the experiential account of aesthetic value outlined above, being medium, form and content (related to each other) aesthetically significant in art, aesthetic response is linked to the qualities of the object itself. Now, as I argued before, knowledge informs aesthetic experience and, especially when dealing with art, could be crucial for the appreciation of aesthetic properties. This means that for somebody to recognize something as art they must connect it with familiar traditions and practices of art appreciation, in which context aesthetic qualities are also learnt. At least since Hume, and although certain natural capacity was claimed necessary for aesthetic perception, knowledge and familiarity with art have been accepted as conditions to improve our aesthetic judgements. They make us more receptive to the qualities that would emerge experiencing a work of art. This is, according to David Hume, a double process of training in knowledge and affection. We learn to identify artistic qualities and at the same time to affectively response to them. Of course, the process is meant to be very complex and dynamic one and it will demand practice, comparison, and attention to others' viewpoints. But after all, this would be the process through which our aesthetic judgments would improve and hopefully converge in a norm of taste.

Very often though, it has been remarked that the circularity of this justification of aesthetic judgments would not avoid relativism and conventionalism. Nowadays the problem also increases since art has changed very rapidly and contemporary art practices have developed reaching a huge range of pluralism and heterogeneity that leave many people without the acquaintance that would help them to avoid being indifferent or puzzled. Even among those more acquainted with it, the artistic scenario looks too fragmented to talk about aesthetic canons. The artistic offer is huge and everybody seems to value it according to their own taste. But, instead of the fragmentation and pluralism in practice and criticism, there is still room for aesthetic agreement. Aesthetic canons or criteria have not disappeared from culture and art worlds and they would allow certain level of consensus for appreciation and selection of artworks. Nevertheless, we are likely to share our tastes with those that share the "culture" that Wittgenstein saw behind every aesthetic judgment²⁴.

Relating to Hume and Wittgenstein, Yves Michaud has shown how our taste is not innate, spontaneous, or natural, it is the result of a training process in different aesthetic

"language games" that shape it; the "language games of evaluation that also are the language games of perception and feeling".²⁵ Being so, standards of taste arise from convergent aesthetic appreciations. Inside what Michaud calls a "community of evaluation which is articulated with a community of production" and about certain axiologically appreciated objects certain common culture is developed and it generates criteria that, given any aesthetic judgements, will allow us to assess them as correct or incorrect. Therefore, we can learn to identify and affectively react to certain qualities, which are the "objective counterpart" but decided by convention.²⁶ Aesthetic values are learnt inside particular "language games"; in fact, according to Michaud, we could not have the right experience without entering in a certain language game.

Michaud names his position "conventionalism under strict restrictions", although defends himself from being a mere conventionalist. It's true that he offers a circular humane justification for aesthetic judgments that locates aesthetic values in the context of certain cultural heritage and practices, but being part of the question, this inevitable circularity would not be vicious.²⁷ Besides, aesthetic conventions finally rest on the language used to refer to anything in the world, a language that works as condition of possibility of any knowledge. Aesthetic conventions connect then with a network of deeper conventions and basic consensus that makes them appear natural. Again, this points to the deep personal, historical and cultural roots of aesthetic appreciation but it also explains its claims of normativity.

These arguments would count against scepticism about the rationality, objectivity, and communicative nature of aesthetic judgments; against those who claim that, especially when considering the affective component of aesthetic experience in which they are based, the expressive nature of aesthetic judgments would make them equally valid. Aesthetic judgement is personal, but is also expressed in a shared language (more or less specialized) and in the context of common beliefs about the world. So we can discuss our aesthetic appreciations on interpersonal basis. Our aesthetic experience being informed, there is nothing –in my opinion– like the difference between a purely aesthetic and a normative judgement.²⁸ When judging and claiming the reliability of our aesthetic judgments we play the role of qualified critics,²⁹ although we could recognize that we could be wrong or the expertise of other people, instead of even persistent disagreement between them.

Therefore, the transcendental (in a kantian sense) role of our aesthetic language games makes sense of both aesthetic agreement and disagreement, because our conventions are not meant to play a deterministic role. Aesthetic agreements would be after all agreements between sensibilities. Artworks do not prompt or stimulate our thought, imagination, and feeling rigidly in the same way for all observers³⁰, and aesthetic experiences would change (we will see new aspects, new challenges). Even with those that share our taste, there is room for disagreement, and new aesthetic proposals could be appreciated and accepted. In fact, disagreement doesn't have to be necessarily negative as sometimes diversity in taste and appreciation is in fact valued. In the early philosophical aesthetics, the autonomous exercise of taste was recognized as a crucial aspect of the rationality of the free individual, and still today its democratic value could be appreciated as a guarantee of pluralism.³¹

Certainly, from a sociological perspective, disagreement in aesthetic matters seems more tolerable than, let's say, in science or morals. This would happen because, according to

Michaud, aesthetic language games stand on deeper forms of understanding, like those on which the world and morality are founded. And so, even if aesthetic disagreements seem to deeply damage personal relationships and vice versa, we should not exaggerate the importance of both, agreements and disagreements. The romantic project that kept the hope of a world in peace based on aesthetic agreement, could not be then but a utopia. Equally exaggerated would be to use apparently irresolvable aesthetic disagreements to prove the incompatibility of diverse forms of life.³² Obviously art does not have the power of turn us into better people, and possibly the normative force of its "arguments" is weaker than other kind of theoretical and practical discourses'. However, aesthetic form of understanding is that of sensibilities, and so permits a kind of perception that touches us in a more special and intimate way than cold discursive reason does. Aesthetic experiences run deep in human life, connecting us personally with one another, with our own history and culture but also with wider human relations and morality, with the chance of increasing their potential community of evaluation. Given the force of aesthetic communication, the relationships of art with truth, or with morals and politics have never been ignored even for the great defenders of artistic autonomy.

Finally, the critical and political potential of (particularly contemporary) art seems neutralized in the current scenario. In a more recent book³³, Michaud himself argues that we are living in a globalized society of consumerism where art is demanded as any other product. In our societies, aesthetic beauty has triumphed invading everything. We consume beauty, there is a huge demand for it and so for artists, but art seems to dissolve becoming the air we breathe (our aesthetic atmosphere). The problem for artists is then that "what they do is already done in society"³⁴ and their reaction usually is to try making the distinction between art and life precisely separating art from aesthetics. But according to the account I have defended here, this would be not so much a separation as a response to trivial social aestheticism employing artistic mechanisms which are also susceptible to aesthetic evaluation. By trying to distort the conventional look of things, surely the language employed would be difficult and would need some effort from the public to find it significant. If achieved, the artist and public would be playing on the same pitch. Although with more recent artistic production we lack historical perspective, those works that will keep perceptively, cognitively and affectively challenging the public will find a place in the history of art.

¹ According to Harold Rosenberg's terminology in *The De-Definition of Art*, Nueva York: Horizon Press, 1972.

² Here I follow Schaeffer, Jean-Marie, *Adieu a l'esthétique* [Spanish traslation: *Adiós a la Estética*, Madrid: Antonio Machado Libros, 2005. 35]

³ See Goldman, Alan, "The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 64:3, Summer 2006.

⁴ Danto, Arthur C., *The transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Harvard University Press, 1981.

⁵ Tilghman, Benjamin, "Reflections on Aesthetic Judgement", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 44:3, July 2004. p. 255

⁶ Goldman, Alan, "The Aesthetic", in Gaut, B. (ed) *The Routledge Companions to Aesthetics*, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 191.

⁷ Even in the aesthetic experience of nature. The contemporary philosopher Allen Carlson argues against the kantian idea that, by contrast to art, sees no knowledge involved in the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Carlson urges that both activities involve knowledge, but different sorts of knowledge would be required for each. He also claims that they *should* be different to avoid (often dangerous) mistakes to treat nature. See Carlson, Allen, "Appreciation and the Natural Enviroment", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*,

Spring 1979 quoted by Eaton, Marcia Muelder, "Art and the Aesthetic", in Kivy, P. (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004.

⁸ Goldman, Alan, "The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value", p. 337.

⁹ Goldman, Alan, "Evaluating Art", in Kivy, P. (ed.) (2004) *The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics*, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004, p.102.

¹⁰ See Eaton, Marcia Muelder, "Art and the Aesthetic", p. 73.

¹¹ See Vilar, Gerard, *Las razones del Arte*, Madrid: Antonio Machado Libros, 2005, pp.22-23.

¹² Goldman, Alan, "The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value", p.337.

¹³ See Eaton, Marcia Muelder, "Art and the Aesthetic", p. 70.

¹⁴ In the Eighteenth century Alexander Baumgarten was first to use the term "aesthetic" in terms of perception to refer to cognition by the means of the senses, sensuous knowledge.

¹⁵ Goldman, Alan, "The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value", p.338.

¹⁶ See Eaton, Marcia Muelder, "Art and the Aesthetic".

¹⁷ An aesthetic judgment was originally called judgment of "taste". Carolyn Korsmeyer, who has deeply studied the origins of the "metaphor of taste" that modifies its original meaning from the gustatory appreciation of food or drink to value art, has pointed out an important reason for the successful use of the term "taste" during the XVI, XVII, and XVIII centuries. This is, the idea of knowledge and pleasure being intimately connected when appreciating art [See, Korsmeyer, Carolyn, *Making sense of taste*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999] I agree with her and I think that, against an excessive conceptualism in certain contemporary theories of aesthetic experience, the metaphor of taste should be rescued [See, Carrasco, Matilde, "La naturaleza de las propiedades estéticas y su papel en una nueva estética del gusto", *Enrahonar*, 39, 2007]. But there is surely a difference between art and food or other objects that we can find merely decorative or beautiful that in terms of the richness and the cognitive-affective challenges that we obtain by experiencing them aesthetically.

¹⁸ Vilar, Gerard, *El desorden estético*, Barcelona: Idea Books, 2000, p. 50

¹⁹ I take this reflection from a letter by chef Xavier Huguet Queraltó published in a newspaper (*EL PAIS*, Sunday, the 17th of June, 2007, p. 20). Here, he comments Ferran Adriá's recent participation in Documenta Kassel, and argues that we should treat cooks as artisans and not as artists.

²⁰ This is a very difficult subject with multiple aspects that I cannot pursue here. Mass culture and pop art have shown the difficulties of the job.

²¹ See Bourdieu, Pierre, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, London: Routledge, 1989.

²² Tilghman, Benjamin, "Crossing Boundaries", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 46:2, April 2006, p. 183.

²³ Tilghman, Benjamin, *Ibid.*, p. 184.

²⁴ According to Wittgenstein, to describe a whole set of aesthetic rules means to describe the culture of a certain time. See *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief*, (ed. de Cyril Barrett), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1966, I, §25.

²⁵ Michaud, Yves, *Critères esthétiques et jugement de goût*, Spanish translation: *El juicio estético*, Barcelona: Idea Books, 2002, p. 33.

²⁶ Michaud, Yves, *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27. Here, Michaud follows R. Wollheim [Art and its Objects, Cambridge U.P., 1968/1980]. History of art works identifying certain artistic qualities, but other practices would work in the same way (Michaud's examples: how to become an expert in Tony Cragg's sculptures, Spanish horses and rap music).

²⁷ Looking for the standard of taste, Hume appealed to experts or ideal critics, but explained its limits. Even competent critics conflict, and very often, indeed. Knowledge and familiarity would improve our taste meanwhile prejudice (historical and cultural relativism) or differences in our personal character will be causes of conflict. Hume had to reconsider some of the initial conditions of the standard of taste as its limits. They are at the heart of the problem of the standard of taste, but the point is that any standard will come from them. See, Michaud, Yves, *Ibid.*, p. 93.

²⁸ Here I argue against the thesis defended by Jean-Marie Schaeffer in *Adieu a l'esthétique*.

²⁹ See, Goldman, Alan, "Evaluating Art", p. 99.

³⁰ See Goldman, Alan, "The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value", p. 340.

³¹ See Vilar, Gerard, *Las razones del Arte*, p. 232.

³² See Michaud, Yves, *Critères esthétiques et jugement de goût*, pp. 71-74.

³³ *L'art à l'état gazeux. Essay sur le triomphe de l'esthétique*, Paris: Stock, 2003.

³⁴ Eugenia Montalván interviews Yves Michaud, in www.replica21.com.