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**The (Im)possibility of Challenging
Equalization. Topology of Difference and
Deleuzian Political Aesthetics.**

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Introduction

It has become very common to begin talking about representation. The whole structuralist and postmodern set of thinking, theories and philosophies as understood in cultural and media studies dealt a lot with this specific problem. With the advance of new art forms, cinema, new media and the overall spreading and fast developing of this media it has become a necessity to begin talking about the contents of this messages, what this messages bring, what they present, or better, re-present. It is basically a quest for meaning. With structuralism affected with saussurean linguistics and the theory of the sign, every single practice of communication has become a play of meanings and representation, thus bringing the topic to the top of the agenda. Talking about meaning and the shifty discursiveness of different representations has become the daily bread of philosophers, sociologists and other theoreticians alike (and most part of these thinkers never saw themselves as philosophers, sociologists or other theoreticians). In the postmodern era anything can be meant in several different ways (*anything* goes, not *everything* goes),¹ can be part of different discourses or different underlying meanings. So this representational model of discursiveness has become a means of ideology, which is the entity hiding behind this or that discursive order.

It is why my task in the following pages will be to offer a challenge to this notion of representation. It is a very useful task, that of the (post)structural enterprise, to try to denote the mechanisms or the principles working beneath the superficial level of representation, understood as a means of control of a discursive style. But it is not enough. It does not suffice to say that this happens, it should be pointed out why this ‘happens’ should not be happening and it should be proposed what to do, to overcome this ‘happens.’

I will try to propose a critique of the discursiveness of representation based on Deleuze’s thought as developed in *Difference and Repetition*, the book, which is said to be his *magnum opus*. I will relate to his notion of difference and repetition, but will also compare it to similar relevant topics in some of his other works, mainly essays gathered in *Desert Islands and Other Texts*.

Following these basic concepts, which will spring from my brief overview, I will continue to propose one of the possible practical challenges to the discursive representation the work of Austrian filmmaker Kurt Kren.

Difference

Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface, without ceasing to be ground.²

In this phrase we can trace the enterprise of Deleuze's *Difference and repetition*: to find the ground and bring it to the surface, to show that there is not a negative relation between ground and surface, but a unity in difference. Difference will have to rise from the ground to the surface, showing itself. This will be the task of the book. Difference is for Deleuze that which is, that which has to be in the first place, in order for things to become, to bring in the foreground the identical from difference.

Deleuze is, in one way, talking about ontology. The main topics, the questions rising in *Difference and Repetition* are questions on Being, its role, its structure. This is why Deleuze starts with a thorough analysis of the notions of Being and identity, affirmation, negation and the problems of the One and the multiple. He finds these notions for analysis in the works of Plato, Aristotle, the neo-Platonists (Plotinus), Duns Scotus, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and finally Nietzsche and Bergson. The task is to show that difference, in the progression of western philosophy from the Greeks until the break between nineteenth and twentieth century, has been a difference related to the concept of identity. What differed was always comparing to a notion of identical, of a unity (usually transcending the faculties of the mind).³

Deleuze searches the very roots of this conception, it is the development of a categorical thinking, a thinking in categories, which comes from Aristotle's critique of Plato⁴ and develops to its apex in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This is a philosophy of reason, of the mind of the subject as the very fundament of judgment, which has to work, to function in some categorical system to be effective, to be rational.⁵

This rationalization, the systematization of judgment is a topic to be discussed and criticized, according to Deleuze. Judgment is a systematical and hierarchical categorizing of concepts into empty spaces, which these concepts must fit. Judgment forces concepts to fit into the categories of the mind, thus forcing them into shape. This recalls the story of Procrustes from Greek mythology. Is not judgment operating exactly as Procrustes did? Does not the categorization sound incredibly similar to Procrustes' stretching and cutting of his visitors, which would never fit into his bed? Judgment as a Procrustean judgment, shrinking and cutting concepts to fit its categories.

For judgment has precisely two essential functions, and only two: distribution, which it ensures by the *partition* of concepts; and hierarchization, which it ensures by the *measuring* of subjects. To the former corresponds the faculty of judgment known as common sense; to the latter the faculty known as good sense (or first sense).⁶

Judgment operates through common sense and first sense. The method of judging is a method based on predefined forms (categories), which work on analogies with identity. Judgment can relate what it finds to categories only by analogy with the identity of a specific category. Thus, "[w]ith its common sense and first sense, [...] the analogy of judgment allows the identity of a concept to subsist, either in implicit and confused form or in virtual form. [...] Analogy is the essence of judgment, but the analogy within judgment is the analogy of the identity of concepts."⁷

Again we can see that the relationship between identity and difference is crucial. Categorizing is affirming identity at the stake of difference. But as I already mentioned, the task of a philosophy of difference is to affirm difference at the stake of identity.

Deleuze describes the aspects of specific (*species*) and general differences (*genus*) related to Being; Being as *genus* (to which different categories of *species* belong – Aristotle). Being, understood as a *genus*, is the highest form possible, thus making impossible any relation to whatsoever. The Being as *genus* is a one and only (identical) concept, to which *species* or differences of categories are subordinated. Or, to say it with Deleuze, "the identity of the genus in relation to the species contrasts with the impossibility for Being of forming a similar identity in relation to the genera themselves."⁸ In other words, for a (post-) Platonist philosophy, difference was always related to a concept of identity, the *genus*, to which different categories of *species* pertain. And if the task of a philosophy of difference is to bring into force the independency of difference, a difference independent from an identity, the most known motto of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* becomes clear: "[a] single voice raises the clamour of being."⁹

At first sight Being can be understood as *genus*, but it is not in this way that Deleuze understands univocity: Being is not One as a *genus*, Being is exactly the many *species*, the singular differences which are subdued to a *genus* in the thought of the philosophers of categories. There is a single voice, but this voice is not one. It is the voice of difference, the sense of difference.

Again, Being is not *genus*.¹⁰ Manifest differences, the differences, which we can see and understand, almost like phenomena, are differences of form or formal differences. Although there are various formal differences, there is just one being, which has only one sense and is expressed through in this one sense, is expressed of the different itself.

The single voice of Being is the one voice of difference, pure difference as the sole possible affirmation: "[i]n effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities."¹¹

That which is said is not ONE difference but the various differences related to this unique multiplicity of difference, which is to be found in pure difference as Being. Being is said of difference itself.¹²

Formal differences DO NOT bow to the univocal difference, to pure difference as a single sense; formal differences are aspects of the multiplicity of pure difference, its multifacetedness. Univocity is not a single fixed sense but the sense of difference itself; affirming difference contra identity, or as Deleuze claims in his essay *Bergson*:

In other words, being is difference and not the immovable or the undifferentiated, nor is it contradiction, which is merely false movement. Being is the difference itself of the thing, what Bergson often calls the *nuance*.¹³

This is the challenge to common sense as a quality of judgment. To overthrow the categorical thinking of judgment, to overthrow Kant (and Hegel), is to affirm difference, to defy the rules of categorization and distribution – normalization:

A distribution of this type proceeds by fixed and proportional determinations which may be assimilated to 'properties' or limited territories within representation.¹⁴

Judgment operates through representations; every form must fit in a specific conceptual drawer, which is all together held up in a peculiar systematic closet. To practice contemporary philosophy is for Deleuze to dismantle this closet; he demands that "identity not be first, that it exist as a principle, but as a second principle, as a principle *become*; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical."¹⁵

The main task of *Difference and repetition* is to make a Copernican turn, to change the perception of difference as the negation of identity (present in the most part of western philosophy from the ancient Greeks onward) to a difference independent of identity. But not only independent of identity as the very basic of everything, difference as the very ontological core, its base: difference-in-itself.

And as Deleuze claims already in 1956 in his essay on Bergson, this does not mean that we have "to abandon reason but to reconnect with the true reason of the thing in the process of being made, the philosophical reason that is not determination but difference."¹⁶ The task of philosophy is *not determining but differentiating*.

Repetition and eternal return

After this brief summarization of the concept of difference *à la* Deleuze, I should slowly bring things to the concept of the eternal return and repetition. In fact, the philosophy of *Difference and Repetition* is a philosophy based on Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return. Deleuze constantly returns to the pointing out of the importance of the eternal return. As the title of this work says, difference is strongly related to repetition, understood as the eternal return. Or it would be better to say, that repetition is strongly related to difference. In fact, it is difference, which is the central point of the eternal return, its joint, its axis. The eternal return revolves around difference. This is why Deleuze argues that the eternal return should not be conceived as the eternal return of the same but as the eternal return of the different; that which returns is not a single and same thing, but the very true difference of the univocity of being.

The eternal return does not bring back the 'the same', but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different.¹⁷

Eternal return (for Deleuze as much as for Nietzsche) is selective: it does not think about *genera* or *species*, but of selection. It does not repeat the same (cyclic time of repetition) but the different. For eternal return to be effective, to be what Nietzsche conceived of it – will to power – it must be the eternal return of potentialities.¹⁸ Not of fixed beings but of becoming. No fixed point should be retained in eternal return (that would be representational, normalization), but only what has potentiality, difference as becoming: again, not identity but difference.

Only the extreme forms return – those which, large or small, are deployed within the limit and extend to the limit of their power, transforming themselves and changing one into another.¹⁹

On the contrary, to be immobile (fixed in being) is to be absorbed into resentment. Not letting the extreme forms return, society falls into a deep state of uneasiness, which must

be dealt with methodologies deriving from those identities, that caused it. A cry should be heard: the eternal return!

The secret of the eternal return is that it in no way expresses some regulation, imposing itself and subjecting chaos. All the contrary, it is nothing than chaos, the power which affirms chaos.²⁰

Eternal return is the power of difference, the repetition of the non-equal, a consistent de-equalization of judgmental categorization. It is the power of the different over the forces of regulation and normalization/equalization.

Eternal return is not dealt with only in *Difference and Repetition* but is a recurring topic in Deleuze's work. In *On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy*, he proposes the notion of *time out of joint*: "a door which is off the hinges, means the first great Kantian turn: movement is subject to time. Time is no longer bound to movement."²¹

Time is no longer cyclic, it is straightened out, stretched into infinity, becomes a line. The present becomes a pure boundary, a simple and super-boundary, the line is that which comes from infinity and goes to infinity, and it drags with itself the difference from point to point, from thinking to thinking, from concept to concept.

The labyrinth has changed direction: it is no longer a circle or a spiral, but a thread, a pure line, which is much more mysterious that more it is simple, inexorable, dreadful – 'a labyrinth which is constituted by just one line and which is indivisible, incessant.'²²

In this straight line, the line of escape, succession is defeated, there is only a succession, which is put forward by a reference of the now related to the past. The succession is referential, only of reference, it is the condensation of the past into the present, which is constantly passing. Time is not successive, it does not succeed another time. It is the distinction of time as *Chronos* and *Aiôn*, exactly the difference between cyclical and linear time; it is the form of the event, which never was and never will be, the single point of the instant, which can be thought of only as a reference to the past and future. It is the boundary, a zero point which explodes in the directions of the past and the future.

If Chronos was bounded and infinite, the Aiôn is limitless as the future and past, but finite as an instant. If Chronos was inseparably connected with the circulation and happening, which can occur to the circulation, as the blockades or rashnesses, ruptures, dismantlements, hardenings, the Aiôn stretches in a straight line, which is unbounded on both sides. The always already past and the eternally coming Aiôn is the eternal truth of time: *the pure empty form of time*, which has liberated itself from its corporeal content and has in this way unfolded its circle, it pulls itself into a line and is for the sake of this perhaps even more dangerous, even more labyrinthine, even more wearying.²³

And from here comes Deleuze's demand to redefine time (and also space). Time must not be seen as a succession of events but as the very base of everything, which takes place in event. Time is a constant, time is at the base of change and movement, time is the base and as such the form of change and movement.

It is again a mode of thinking influenced by difference and repetition, molded into eternal return. If we want time to be linear we must erase the circular notion of time, but even in this way can time still be repetitive: its repetition is exactly the repetition of difference, variation, movement.

It is the form of everything which varies and moves, but it is an invariable form, which does not change. It is not an eternal form but precisely a form of that, which is not eternal, the invariable form of change and movement.²⁴

And "[i]t is not the Same that returns, because the returning is the originary form of the Same, which is only said of the different, of the multiple, of becoming. The same does not return, it is only the returning of the Same of that which become."²⁵

It is a challenge to the Same, understood as infinite representation. Deleuze confronts order with chaos (regulation as identity *vis à vis* chaos as difference), putting the first in the old values, normality (common sense) and the second into the new, new values or what Nietzsche would call the will to power.²⁶

"Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference."²⁷ This means that representation moves nothing,²⁸ that representation is a stand-still, a single point, which is fixed and doesn't move. The Same is fixed, motionless, static, common-sensical. It is representation of equalities, of fixed and agreed-upon meanings. It is what Deleuze calls *infinite representation*, a representation which: "includes precisely an infinity of representations – either by ensuring the convergence of all points of view on the same object or the same world, or by making all moments properties of the same Self."²⁹

Repetition of the same or identical is, in my opinion, an equalizing (stereotype, common sense) practice, which is to be found in the very core of the logic of the State – its despotic nature. And it is something which is even accentuated in the modern capitalist mode of (re)production (something similar to what Debord was talking about in *The Society of the Spectacle*). Applying common sense to any situation is thus a way of not thinking, an effect of ideology, the territorialization of the State in the capitalist system. In this respect I see a challenge to this type of common-sense-making or equalization in human practices that underline difference and its repetition. To show difference in-itself is to question common sense and equalization (the primacy of identity).

Anti-Platonism as critique of representation

The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism.³⁰

For Plato, there exist ideas, which are then copied into the material world. This is the first step away from the good, the purity of the Idea. That is why Plato does not regard art as something positive. The artist, the one who makes *techné* is not someone who deals with something greater (the romantic view of the artist), but he is just someone who is able to make copies (the Greek *techné* is in fact art intended as craft, i.e. that the artist is a craftsman, someone who is able to skillfully reproduce (non-)existing objects of the world in the sense of *mimesis*). So the simulacrum, the image of a real-world thing, is just a copy of a copy, a second step away from the greater good of ideality.

This, for Deleuze, is a fertile ground for the concept of identity. The abstract Idea is One. The Idea is equal only to itself (*genus*), whilst the copies refer to the Idea, they can be said to differ from this concept, on which they ground. Copies are based on the Idea, but they differ from the Idea in that that they are not identical to this Idea, as only the Idea is identical to itself. Difference in this tradition of idealism is related to this great notion of ideal identity, making it just a subordinate concept, not capable of existing without the notion of the higher good.

So what does Deleuze suggest? To try and invert this schema: simulacra are not copies of copies, but already original; simulacra are their own model, embodied difference. The concept of simulacrum, the actualization of the virtual, according to Deleuze, is a positive existence. The simulacrum is not something, that can come to being, but it has being, as I said before, it is its own being. The simulacrum/virtual has no need to be based on something real, on some idea, it is its own model, its own reality and has an actuality all of its own. But this task, the task of overturning Platonism has to retain much of the characteristics of Platonism, it is indeed only an inversion of the hierarchy between idea, the thing and the simulacrum.³¹

The idea is not yet the concept of an object which submits the world to the requirements of representation, but rather a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not 'representable' in things.³²

The idea is not already its unity with the concept, as Deleuze says, it has not yet given up the task to find difference at its core.³³

Deleuze sees this potential in the method of *division*, again compared between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle thinks of division as the dividing of a genus into opposing species. A unity is divided into particularities – this notion retains the concept of identity (the genus). Plato, on the contrary, deals with division as relating species (thus affirming difference, not positing it under the identity of a concept, but relating different species on to the other, without a genus). Platonist division is a multiplicity of genus/species; not different species but a division of a unitary representational mixture of species and genus, trying to unveil a single *line of descent*.³⁴ Plato is thus not categorizing³⁵ (putting species under genera), but he nevertheless retains his idealism, a higher identity. But what is required to make of Platonism a philosophy of difference is just the overturning of its hierarchization, putting simulacra in the place of ideas. This is something, that would not be possible in Aristotle's philosophy.

Its point of departure can therefore be either a genus or a species, but this genus or this large species is understood as an undifferentiated logical matter, an indifferent material, a mixture, an indefinite representing multiplicity which must be eliminated in order to bring to light the Idea which constitutes a pure line of descent.³⁶

That is why Plato, contra Aristotle, is fonder of the eternal return, because: "it is a question not of identifying but of authenticating".³⁷ This means that the method of division is exactly the same as the method of eternal return: selection. It is because of this that Deleuze insists in conserving the logic of Platonism, only inverted. Plato's ideas (as thoughts) are already well assessed; all the philosophy of difference has to do is to invert it. To turn it upside-down as the image in the *camera obscura*.

If, before, the copy of an actual object was relating itself to the Idea in the line copy-thing-original (simulacrum-image-idea), in overturned Platonism, the copy is self-relating, thus going along the line copy-thing-copy, cyclically. The simulacrum is already its idea; copy is a copy is a copy is a copy, if we take into account Gertrude Stein.

It is shifting from Idea to simulacrum, reverting the axis: "[a] simulacrum is not some utmost degraded copy, instead it conceals in itself some positive power that negates *as much the original as the copy, as much the model as its reproduction*."³⁸

"Difference is not the negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference",³⁹ difference becomes affirmation and identity becomes negation. Firstly, non-being is (as pure

difference, difference in-itself): it is affirmation, which is later related to negativity (that is being as identity).

In order to think of difference in itself, we have to put difference on another level, not subject to identity, but subjecting identity. "Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of origin over copy, of model over image."⁴⁰

Again, we must cry out loud, that there should be no fixed point, no rationalization, common-sense, normalization, but the pure force of differentiation. "[T]aken in its strict sense, eternal return means that each thing exists only in returning, copy of an infinity of copies which allows neither original nor origin to subsist."⁴¹ Eternal return is not the eternal coming of the same thing (Idea as a model) but is the repetition of infinite copies: this is the point where Deleuze argues, that each simulacrum is already its model. Simulacra don't relate to some primary model because the eternal return is a circle (thus not having a point of departure).

Identity is a fixed point, a point of defining, but for Deleuze: "that which is or returns has no prior constituted identity. [...] For eternal return, [...] allows no installation of a foundation-ground."⁴²

Deleuze is a critic of the Platonic 'ground' – the Idea. Ground is ideal, is identity. Deleuze thus calls for a universal ungrounding,⁴³ the discovery of a ground behind any ground – pure difference.

The fault of representation lies in not going beyond the form of identity.⁴⁴

The Boundary

From all this I am going to condense all of these topics into one conceptualization, which will let me analyze and help to define the importance of Kurt Kren's structural films later on. For doing so I am going to relate to another essay by Gilles Deleuze, entitled *The Method of Dramatization*, starting with two longer quotes, which will be useful for the further development of Deleuze's critique of representation.

Nevertheless, since intensity is difference, differences of intensity must enter into communication. Something like a 'difference operator' is required, to relate difference to difference. This role is filled by what is called an *obscure precursor*. A lightning bolt flashes between different intensities, but it is preceded by an *obscure precursor*, invisible, imperceptible, which determines in advance the inverted path as in negative relief, because this path is first the agent of communication between series of differences. If it is true that every system is an intensive field of individuation constructed on a series of heterogeneous or disparate boundaries, then when the series come into communication thanks to the action of the obscure precursor, this communication induces certain phenomena: *coupling* between series, *internal resonance* within the system, and *inevitable movement* in the form of an amplitude that goes beyond the most basic series themselves. It is under these conditions that a system fills up with qualities and develops in extension. Because a quality is always a sign or an event that rises from the depths, that flashes between different intensities, and that lasts as long as it takes for its constitutive difference to be nullified. And most importantly, these conditions taken together determine spatio-temporal dynamisms, which themselves are responsible for generating qualities and extensions.⁴⁵


Dynamisms, and all that exists simultaneously with them, are at work in every form and every qualified extension of representation; they constitute not so much a picture as a group of abstract lines coming from the unextended and formless depth. [...] These abstract lines constitute a drama which corresponds to this or that concept, and which also directs its specification and division. Scientific knowledge, the dream, as well as things in themselves –

these all dramatize. Given any concept, we can always discover its drama, and *the concept would never be divided or specified* in the world of representation *without the dramatic dynamisms* that thus determine it in a material system beneath all possible representation.⁴⁶

In this respect I would like to point out the importance of this text for the present enterprise, and that is the relationship between the spatio-temporal dynamisms and the question of representation. One of the properties of the spatio-temporal dynamisms, according to Deleuze,⁴⁷ is to express Ideas.⁴⁸ Spatio-temporal dynamisms are thus modes of representation of the Idea. This Idea is twofold, it has a virtual and an actual "mode", so to say (to be found also throughout *Difference and Repetition*). There is no whatsoever opposition between the virtual and real in Deleuze – recall his critique of ground and the quote on the lightning mentioned above. He argues that the virtual is already real. Real is in opposition with the possible, possibility.⁴⁹ As for the virtual it is in opposition with the actual (the virtual and actual are like two faces of the same medal, one would be tempted to say of the same plane of immanence).


The actual is the real as the actualization of virtuality. It could be defined as the representation of virtuality. This relates the whole thing back to Deleuze's critique of the primacy of the Idea in Plato, where the absolute (a term not used by Plato) Idea is the model for copies and simulacra. But here the order is inversed (that's Deleuze's anti-Platonism): the Idea is virtual; that is to say: the Idea is already its simulacrum (a reversal of Deleuze's: a simulacrum is already its Idea). This is the critical opposition between immanence and transcendence. Plato's Idea is a transcendent Idea, something not available as an object for the mind (as Kant's *Ding an sich*) whilst Deleuze's Idea is an Idea in the immanent. His Idea works and inhabits immanence, always pertains to the real and actual, although as its opposite, dark side.

It must be kept in mind, that the virtual functions as the other side of the medal, but it is not another plane, something which lies underneath the actual, a ground. The virtual IS beneath the actual, but they are separated only by the BOUNDARY, by an infinitesimally thin line. The actual is not a plane covering the plane of the virtual. Both are part of the same plane (the plane of immanence), but they are nevertheless separated: by a nothing,⁵⁰ which is the boundary. I am proposing a schema to explain the relation virtual/actual:



Schema I. Representation of the plane of immanence; relation actual/virtual in spherical geometry

In *Schema I* we have a representation of the couple virtual/actual in spherical geometry. It is a practical model, because it permits the opposition between virtual and actual on a two-sided plane, divided only by a line – represented as a segment of the sphere. It must be noted that this line (the boundary), can be defined only by its length (which is of no relevance for us at the moment), while its width is equal to zero. It is the nothing that separates (or joins) the virtual from the actual. Here we find the upper part of the plane (the actual) covering the lower part (the virtual). But there is a slight non-consistency in the representation of the plane of immanence in spherical geometry – both actual and virtual are on the same plane, but opposed as two sides. We have already seen that the plane of immanence has only one side, which is twofold. That is why the second schema will be more appropriate.



Schema II. A more appropriate representation of the relation actual/virtual in the model of the Möbius strip

In the case of *Schema II* we encounter the Möbius strip, a non-orientable one-sided surface with only one boundary component. What happens with the virtual and the actual in this case? The opposed pair virtual/actual can no longer be defined. This brings further the claim, that the actual is not something, which is impressed over the virtual, a layer on top of the virtual, but is indeed a permutation of the virtual. Virtual and actual are on the

same plane, just differently seen (in *The Fold*, Deleuze will talk about the folding of the surface of the plane of immanence⁵¹). The only thing we can define remains the boundary.

We are here confronted with the irrepresentability of the dyad virtual/actual, but I think that if the plane of immanence could be represented, it should be represented as the Möbius strip. Here, there are not two sides anymore, the bright and the dark side of a two dimensional moon. We have a one-sided medal, a one-sided moon, which has "a dark side" only depending from the point on which we are on it. This surface has the quality of infinity, i.e. we cannot reach its end, as it has no beginning. If life has two doors: an entrance and an exit, Möbius' strip has none. If we start on the bright side of the plane and continue our journey on, we are to discover that the same bright side becomes in one moment the dark side. There is a perpetual changing of moods, a constant change from virtual to actual on the plane of the Möbius strip, the constant folding and unfolding of the plane. Shortly, the actual and the virtual are separated regarding the position in a specific spatio-temporal dynamism.

In the *Logic of Sense*, pure difference (the plane of immanence) gets the denomination sense (*sens*). *Sens*, in French, has different meanings of which two are important for us: 1. sense, meaning; 2. direction. In what relation is this with the model of the Möbius strip and the unitary dichotomy of virtual/actual? For the deconstruction of the actual (understood as equalization) we have to come to *sens* (sense) itself (pure difference). To achieve this we must define the *sens* (direction) on the plane of immanence (in the model of the Möbius strip), which is otherwise *sans sens* (without direction/senseless).

So our task is not to define whether we are on the bright side of the actual or on the dark side of the virtual. Our challenge is to change the point of view, to move along the plane, to look away at things. This is the job of challenging representation, the job of de-equalization.

The clear and distinct is the claim of the concept in the Apollonian world of representation; but beneath representation there is always the Idea and its distinct-obscure depth, a drama beneath every logos.⁵²

The task recalls Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and the praise of Greek literary art. It is the challenge to the Apollonian and the affirmation of the Dionysian. Again, it is a question of relation between chaos and order, difference and representation.

Overturing Platonism, criticizing representation, determining the couple virtual/actual is to find the very core of things. It is to perform a kind of *husserlian reduction*, to strip from the different of identity these very formal differences, and find pure difference – the boundary, which relates all of differences in the Univocity of Being.

If philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy claim to grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its *internal difference*.⁵³

I already mentioned two types of difference, difference in-itself and formal difference. In his text *Bergson's Conception of Difference*, Deleuze claims that differences of nature are differences of the *genus*: "we already know that internal difference exists, *given that there exist differences of nature between things of the same genus*."⁵⁴

It is necessary to denote the differences of nature, the differences of the Identical, the One (*genus*), to come to pure difference. Bergson, Deleuze argues, holds the position that there is a need for, or rather that we must, create a concept, which is applicable only to one object; a concept unique to the conceptualized thing. "This unity of the thing and the concept is internal difference, which reaches through differences of nature."⁵⁵ Differences of nature are the common-sense generalizations, normalizations or what I introduced above: equalizations. So, the task of philosophy is exactly de-equalization, the depriving of the naturalization of a concept. Philosophy, with de-equalization, de-actualizes formal differences, differences of nature, to find the very core of the unity between concept and thing, i.e. internal or pure difference.

Deleuze provides an example for the conceptual singularity: colors. If we remove from red its redness, from blue its blueness, from green its greenness, we are left with one concept, "which is a genre, and many objects for one concept."⁵⁶ But if we condense the colors, through an inverted prism, into one single point of whiteness, we get to know that colors are not concepts in-themselves but just "nuances or degrees of the concept itself."⁵⁷ Red is an agreement, but it is indeed difficult to define *redness*. This is why the concept of Idea, the Idea of red, is not sufficient and begs for overturning.⁵⁸ To condense ideas into that one point of singularity, which already holds in itself all the concepts of various Ideas. This is the inverted prism that is capable of overturning Platonism.

The virtual contains already the different senses of a thing; the connection between thing and concept is already defined in internal difference. It is thus affirming the virtual over the actual. Virtualization would be another name for our task: that of overturning Platonism, of affirming difference over identity.

It is our ignorance of the virtual that makes us believe in contradiction and negation. The opposition of two forms is only the actualization of a virtuality that contained them both: this is tantamount to saying that difference is more profound than negation or contradiction.⁵⁹

Structural film

I am going to propose an example, which may clarify the things I mentioned above. I am talking about a specific kind of cinema, originating in the late fifties and developed in the sixties; i.e. structural film. There are many theories about who initiated the genre, who developed it, which rules are to be followed to make a structural film, or rather, which ones are deemed as official.⁶⁰ I will not follow this debate but rather pick one of the names from the canonized structural film pool and try to develop the aforementioned hypotheses. The picked name would be that of Kurt Kren.

Kren started his experimental film-making in the early fifties and later, in 1964, started his cooperation with the Austrian art group, the Vienna Actionists, lasting until 1969. The works before 1964 and after 1969 are, in my opinion, his most productive periods. In fact, the takes of the Actionists performances are actually more documentary in nature than his other films. This does not dismiss the structural technique or depth of value of these works by Kren; they are just a little less important for my current enterprise (there, Kren is the least *krenian* because he is a co-author – he is filming works which are created in front of the camera, the actions performed by Günther Brus, Otto Mühl and other members of the group). But I would nevertheless like to note that there is still something of the boundary present in these other films. In his actionist films, the

boundary functions as the deconstruction (de-actualization) inside the order of the *filmic* – it makes stutter the language of filmic documentary.

This is also the starting point of my hypothesis, i.e. that Kren's films are films that make stutter the language of film, filmic language.

But what is this so called structural film, what makes it so different, to propose it as an art form, which according to the developed thesis, challenges representation, equalization, the non-changed actual? What lies in Kren's structural films? First of all, regarding representation, Kren's films don't deal with representation. Kren's films are films about what lies beyond ordinary representation, his films don't portray, they make visible, they express. They express the media itself, with all of its elements, with all of its constitutive parts, namely time, space, the viewer's eye or gaze and so on – structural films are showing the lack of the filmic illusion.

According to Gidal, structural film: "attempts to be non-illusionist. The process of the film's making deals with devices that result in demystification or attempted demystification of the film process. But by 'deals with' I do not mean 'represents'. In other words, such films do not document various film procedures, which would place them in the same category as films which transparently document a narrative, a set of actions, etc."⁶¹

The illusionist effect in cinema is representation itself. In structural film representation is denied, annihilated, even forbidden. The pictures we see, the images moving in front of us are, structurally speaking, not images of something, complete signs, but mere signifiers, signifiers without signified, unable to create a sign. Or better, it is a form of deterritorialization, the expression of a sign without meaning. It is part of the minoritarian status of Kren's enterprise, his becoming animal:

Becoming animal means exactly this, to move, to draw the line of flight in all its positive sense, to cross the threshold, reach a lasting intensity, which is important only for itself, find a world of pure intensity in which all the forms and meanings crumble, signifiers and signifieds, in a well un-shaped matter, deterritorialized flows, signs "without meaning."⁶²

Structural film does not represent, it signals. Here, this signaling should be taken as not only a denomination (concept) of saussurean (structural) semiotics, but it goes beyond. Deleuze's thought grew not only as a critique of representation but also as a critique of the far too-narrow notion of the sign in structuralism. In fact, the denial of the structural sign is the affirmation of a sign, which is indeed thought of in a much broader way,⁶³ a sign that is the purest signaling, namely the becoming from difference itself – the lightning bolt over the obscurity of pure difference – i.e. creation.⁶⁴

Structural film, with its signs, is thus expressing, it is the expression of the idea, of pure difference. As Deleuze states in *Spinoza and the Problem of Expression*: "[t]here is a content of the idea, an expressive and not representative content, which relates only to the power of thinking."⁶⁵ Non-representational signaling, expressing, is the coming to truth of difference.

So structural film tries to go beyond representation (actualization, normalization) to show structure itself, what is behind normality and equality. Structural film has to be seen in relation to classical fiction (and non) cinema. We have to confront representational

cinema, the cinema of rules and filmic language,⁶⁶ and anti- or non- representational cinema, such as structural film.

I am arguing that the representation going on in Kren's short movies is not a narrative logical succession of images, but rather a *bricolage*, a montage of simulacra that tend to point out difference itself, in our case the difference between single frames. A difference I named the boundary (which, in cinema, comes to being as the cut).

Kren, with his structural films challenges the very notion of identity and equalization, understood as the process of the capitalist machine or despot to make things equal.⁶⁷ Equalization is common sense, which is to be challenged if we want to get freed from the chains or bounds of ideological practices (at least to try to).

Kren is not telling stories, what he really is showing us is the boundary, the cut, what is between two different frames. He shows the obscure precursor: difference in-itself, pure difference.

We have seen in the previous chapter, that the task of a philosophy of difference is to challenge identity and normalization. But it is not only the task of philosophy: it has also to be the task of science and the arts. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze defines three realms: philosophy, science and art, each operating through a specific plane related to the plane of immanence: the plane of consistence (philosophy), the plane of reference (science) and the plane of composition (the arts), which are sutured, work all together. This means that a change in a single plane affects also the other planes (here we can paraphrase Lacan and say that the three deleuzian modes of thinking are intertwined in a Borromean knot⁶⁸); a change in art can change something in philosophy.⁶⁹

That is why I am taking an example from arts, because I see in this relation the potential of Kren's high-speed editing. We have no more the relation of one image to another in the sense of a linear story (here it should be appropriate to criticize genres; aren't they the repetition of identity, a rule, a common sense?), but the relation of pure images to cuts. So what it really goes on in Kren's work is the appearance of the cut (which I am saying it is pure difference).

Some characteristics, which will develop throughout his work, can be traced already in his second film (but the first to be strictly structural), 1960's *48 Kopfe aus dem Szondi-Test* (48 Heads From the Szondi-test). Here we can find the high-speed editing of short shots, repeating, fragmenting and differentiating one from another. The film is a sequence of the 48 images from the psychological test, invented by Hungarian psychiatrist Lipot Szondi. The test aims at defining a patient's illness by taking into account which pictures a patient chooses. Szondi believed that a patient with a specific illness would chose the pictures of other people afflicted by that illness, claiming that the patient would identify with the somatic characteristics of other people with the same pathology.

A dangerous normalizing practice – Szondi's test – is thus metaphorically transfigured onto film, again in the form of structural film, challenging the normalization of filmic practice. The 48 pictures of the faces of patients, suffering from mental diseases, are fragmented into parts of the face. No more typical pictures of mentally ill people, but their parts; their eyes, chins, mouths, ears, etc. It is exactly the affirmation of the different, the people from the Szondi-test cannot be put all into one category. Szondi's test is a test subject to judgmental method, the method of putting into categories. Kren, in

this film, is making a sort of deleuzean *schizoanalysis*, he affirms the 'normality' of the different over the 'normality' of the normal.

But I finally see the apex of this cut-showing in his late film *Asyl* (1975), which is for Kren's opus what my *Schema II* is for the here dealt notion of the plane of immanence. It puts the images on a single-sided surface and shows in a definite way the boundary, thus leaving open the fields of actual and virtual.

The beginning of *Asyl* is an almost completely black screen with a couple of color dots in the upper left corner of the image. Then, gradually, the whole structure of the picture becomes a seek and hide of spots and blots, which cover and uncover a bigger picture; small eruptions and turbulences appear on the filmic surface only to disappear again, to dissolve in blackness. We can gradually grasp what is depicted, but what is depicted is varying in time and situations. We have the whole picture of a multiplicity of pictures, and it goes on for eight good minutes.

Kren put his camera on a fixed point in a room, looking to a yard in front of the window. Then, he gradually exposed three rolls of film for a period of 21 days. But each day, each roll, each meter of the roll was exposed in a different manner. Every shot was made with a mask in front of the lens, letting through only a small beam of light, which exposed just a part of the roll. Then, changing the masks and rolls, Kren got that incredible effect of appearing and disappearing, changing and mingling spots, forming a general picture.

In *Asyl* we have an apparently one-cut sequence of images on one plane. We see difference rolling over and over again in those tiny different spaces on the plane of the film. Kren is thus showing not only the "boundary" and in this way the difference in-itself, the eternal recurring of difference. He is also showing the eternal recurring of the subject's split, or the subject's multiplicity.

Although he is not talking about Deleuze, Michael Palm finds some interesting characteristics, also useful for an understanding of difference. Talking about *Asyl*, he claims that Kren: "divides the image field into many 'molecular', equal points, which result in again and again a new picture in their constantly changing constellation."⁷⁰ We know that the differentiation between *molecular* and *molar* is a common point in Deleuze (in his work with Guattari); and it is also related to the above mentioned division between *genus* and *species*, or *order* to *chaos*. This is the eternal return of Kren's cinema: the affirmation of difference over identity, of particulars, singularities over unity and generalization. And it is in this *chaotisation* that the challenge to form and representation is expressed. By letting the boundary to become visible, we have no more normality, no editing logic, no filmic time, not a story, no representations.

Such a radical cracking of the picture into its molecular components and the differing temporal connections [Multitemporalitaet] lead finally to the constant reconstruction of the picture and prevent the reconstruction of a representative picture just like the appointment of identity.⁷¹

In Kren, identity is defied at the sake of difference. Representations dissolve in a multiplicity of infinitesimally small parts of images (molecules), which no longer try to form or conceptualize a whole picture, a picture of unity, but strive to become the so called line of descent, a pure escaping from the laws of equalization.

That is also the challenging of the still present myth of the unity of the subject, the *cogito*. A great enterprise exists, trying to dissolve the concept of a unified subject (the whole post-structuralist tradition based on a subject with a lack, a subject which is far from one), and Deleuze is one of the members of this dead subjects society. Or, to put it in another way, the subject is a multiplicity of its views, a multiplicity of deeds, specificities, characteristics. The subject is more characters. This is some sort of drama-theory, a topic close to sociologists, but also a very philosophical theory, a challenge to make the subject not one but made up from differences (I differ in my role as member of my family, as friend, as lover, etc.), I can not be defined with a unity, with one signifier. There is not one unifying signifier able to define me as a whole subject, an individuum. My individuality, my sum of all parts is exactly the sum of everything but the One. Something Deleuze designates as *n-1*. I am the multiplicity of *n*-characteristics, but subtracting the one of unity. *Je est un autre*, said Rimbaud.

In this sense there exist a revelatory aspect of cinema: the ability to propose a multiple point of view, a de-subjectified viewer. Cinema, dealing with editing, *montage*, and angles (e.g. Welles' *Citizen Kane*, but even Kren) is in some way always cubist. If we see a situation, the filmic description of a room, we are able to show it multi-faceted, we can show all of its sides at once (considering the filmic time as non-linear, going on at the same moment), thus defying Husserl's famous theory of perception, where we can not ever conceive of all of a cube's sides at once. We are limited with the number three. But the cinematic experience allows us to see all of its six sides at once (like in Kren's *Tree Again*, for example).

In set theory, a set is always a subset of the empty set; each set has between its members nothingness, the void, $x=\{\}$. So, if our subject is the set of different characteristics: $x=\{1, 2, 3\}$, he is also something of the void. Our subject as a set x , is part of the multiplicity of the One, which is pure difference. He cannot be defined definitely, as there is always that "something more" which escapes definition: difference.

We should now remember the lightning bolts, used as an example of the apparition of the obscure precursor in Deleuze's essay on the method of dramatization. The "lightning bolts" of which Deleuze talks about are some sort of representation, which cover the *obscure precursor*, the field of the virtual. But anyhow this precursor is always what its name says: something, which comes before. The obscure precursor is always before the lightning bolt, before light there is darkness. Kren has in this regard adopted an editing of darkness, of the obscure. In his films the manifest images are like lightning bolts interrupting and lighting this obscure precursor, the latent difference hiding in the shadow. These lightning reveal the very nature of difference, its obscurity. It is precisely darkness, which is the founding (almost the ground) of the filmic. In fact, in cinema, the sequence of frames is 24 per second. But of these 24 pictures there is another 24 pictures of darkness. The duration of a single image frame is $1/48^{\text{th}}$ of a second, we see the 24 frames in a second, but these frames have a duration of $1/48^{\text{th}}$ of a second. This means, that the other time during the projection we see darkness, 24 frames of darkness with the duration of $1/48^{\text{th}}$ of a second. It is the nature of film itself to inhabit in darkness. And in most of Kren's films the black background is shown; in *Asyl* it exists side-by-side with the lightning bolts, with images of a picture.

Kren's editing is thus non-fluent; it's an editing which jumps. He jump-cuts (not in the strict sense as used in film theory). Let us take the example of *Tv* (1967). *Tv* is a set of

five shots, which are repeated all over again in different lengths, successions and order. They are ordered according to a mathematical formula,⁷² but they never repeat in the same way. The shots are separated by short black intervals, pointing out the difference between sets of shots. Sometimes the black interval is longer or shorter, depending on the sequence of shots, which is going to roll before our eyes. Here we have another affirmation of difference and repetition as opposed to linearity and representation. Kren's eternal return is the returning of the same images, but not of the same set of images. Each shot is repeated in a different relation with other shots, different duration, different punctuation. It is not the Same piece of film that is repeated, but its potential of becoming-other than the previously seen shot.

Again, taking Deleuze into account, this jumping could be connected to his thesis that in literature, the minor author is that author, which makes the language slip (cf. K and A). The language of minor literature is a stuttering language. The minor author makes its own language stutter, he brings something *unheimlich* in the ordinary and natural, the *heimlich* of the used language. In this way, Kren's editing is an editing of stuttering, a stuttering editing of filmic language.

Let us finally recall the already mentioned example of color. This example could be transmuted into Kren's work. We have so many different representations (single frames as single colors), trying to efface the very phenomena of the object in-itself. But this is the wrong way to look at Kren's structural films. We MUST inverse the prism and concentrate the single frames into one point: the cut (boundary). This is almost instantly done in *Asyl*, but can be seen in his other works too (*48 Kopfe aus dem Szondi-Test*, *Baume in Herbst*, *Tv*, etc.). We must project the differents into the single point of pure difference, the boundary.

Conclusion

We have seen that although there can be various ways to express it, the philosophy of difference has one aim: to affirm being as creativity, to impose difference over identity. Conceptualizing difference and repetition (as the eternal return of difference), Deleuze provides a critique of the categorical thinking of judgment. He critiques Kant's Critiques as much as Aristotle's categories. The thinking in categories is a thinking in representations, a thought of the normal. Representation, as the categorization of differences to some species, into categories, is a form of infinite representation, which does not allow for a creative force to become. By fixing forms into categories of identity, the creative motion of life is fixed into these forms, thus becoming the bad view of the eternal return, the eternal return of the Same, of motionless being, of static stagnation.

That is why the task of the philosophy of difference is to affirm itself over identity by overturning Platonism. This overturning of Plato's Idea into a series of copies, simulacra, is the critique to infinite representation, the critique to the normalizing, equalizing practice of common/first sense. As long as any creativity (thinking, making art, researching, ...) is subject to representation, to some fixed meaning, it cannot be creativity, but only reproduction. The critique of representation is the search for the chaotic form of the virtual, which is constantly hidden by formal representation, making it different from the identical, masking it into formal difference: hiding pure difference.

To think of difference is thus to reveal the obscure precursor, that which really is as Being. It is to structurally relate the precursor (virtual) to the lightning bolts (the

actualizations of the virtual), to find the boundary joining/dividing the plane of immanence into virtual and actual. The boundary is the infinitesimally small line, dividing the two. It is in fact not infinitesimally small, but it has exactly a value of zero. The width of this line is nothingness; that is why we can affirm the unitary dichotomy of the couple virtual/actual. The boundary is that which divides the two sides of the plane, which is one sided.

The point in creating is thus not defining on which side of the plane are we, but to find out that the plane is just one and that the normalities we agree upon are just points of view, defined points on the surface of the plane of immanence (understood in the form of the Möbius strip). If we want to be creative (in philosophy, science, art or elsewhere), we have to look away at that point, to MOVE, not to be fixed: to affirm difference as the sole power of creativity and life.

It is here that comes to the full potential the message inherent in Kurt Kren's films. Kren must be understood as minor author who makes stutter the language of the filmic. He is a member of the many minor authors (Kafka, Melville, Carroll, etc.), which really have the force to defy the normality of (any) language (filmic language in our example). It is thus in minority arts that it must be searched for the critique and challenge to representation, for the de-equalization as the de-actualization to the virtual.

Notes and references

¹ Cf. Feyerabend, Paul K. *Against Method*. London, New York: Verso, 2002.

² Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1994, p.28 (from now on abbreviated as DR).

³ Plato's Idea (Form) – a concept, which ran throughout the history of philosophy (I am here relating to Plato's *Republic*, cf. Plato. *The Republic*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1999-2000, books VII and X).

⁴ Nonetheless it must be noted that Plato introduced five Great Kinds (which are very close to Aristotle's categories) in his early dialog *Sophist* (cf. Plato. *Thaetetus. Sophist*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 2002, 254d-e). But in the end it must also be said that in the *Sophist* there is no notion of fixed form, of ideas. This is a common problem in dealing with the thought of Plato, which is very different in time. We are therefore mainly resting on his philosophy from *The Republic*, which is commonly regarded to be Plato's late work.

⁵ It is in fact a rationalization of the world, a systematization: Aristotle, as the most scientific of all philosophers, started to categorize everything, following him, Kant, made the final step when he also proposed his categories in his transcendental analytics (cf. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p.111-120).

⁶ DR, p.33.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.34.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.35.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.36.

¹² Cf. *ibid.*

¹³ Deleuze, Gilles. *Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974*. Cambridge: Semiotext(e), p.25 (from now on abbreviated as DI).

¹⁴ DR, p.36.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.40.

¹⁶ DI, p.31.

¹⁷ DR, p.41.

¹⁸ Cf. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1991, p.38, 41, 572-78 and *passim*; see also his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Ljubljana, Slovenska matica 1999, p.255-56.

¹⁹ DR, p.41.

²⁰ Deleuze, Gilles. *The Logic of Sense*. Ljubljana: Krtina, 1998, p.247 (from now on abbreviated as LS).

²¹ Deleuze, Gilles. "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarise the Kantian Philosophy." In: *Problemi 1/2* (1999), pp.103-110, p.104 (from now on abbreviated as QF).

²² *Ibid.*

²³ LS, p.160.

²⁴ QF, p.105.

²⁵ Deleuze, Gilles. *Nietzsche*. Milano: SE, 2006, p.35.

²⁶ Cf. DR, p.54.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.55.

²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p.56.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.59.

³¹ Cf. *ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, p.59.

³³ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁵ Cf. note 3.

³⁶ DR, p.60.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ LS, p.245.

³⁹ DR, p.64.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.66.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.67.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Cf. ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.68.

⁴⁵ *DI*, p.97.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.98.

⁴⁷ *Cf. DI*, p.94 and *passim*.

⁴⁸ It should be noted that, although Deleuze speaks of the Idea, it is the overturned Idea of his anti-Platonism. Idea as the univocity of Being, as pure difference (the text was written before the publishing of *Difference and Repetition*, thus not having yet fully developed the relation between simulacrum and idea.

⁴⁹ I.e., something which is possible but not necessarily real. Let us take an example from Husserl's: I can imagine a unicorn, which is not a real, living animal I can encounter in the woods, but it still lives in my mind, thus making of it a phenomenon as relevant as the table in front of me right now

⁵⁰ A notion very close to what Sartre founded as *mauvaise foi* (bad faith). The boundary, this nothing is in fact the core of the subject, which is defined by Sartre as: I am what I am not, and I am not what I am. This is very clear in Sartre's example of vertigo and could be paralleled with our defining of the virtual and actual. Sartre says that if I walk along an unsecured precipice, there is some chance that I fall off it. He continues that in this case I can feel a little dizzy because of the danger. But it is not the danger of me falling it is the danger of me jumping. That is why there is no difference between me standing here, on the verge of the precipice, and the hypothetical me at the bottom of the precipice. I am the one standing here, but I am also that person lying dead at the bottom of it. And a pure nothing is what is separating these two selves. So to overcome this dizziness I must employ a self-preserving tactic, which is that of bad faith: I assure myself that I am not suicidal and that I am not going to jump. That is exactly what goes on in the pair of virtual and actual: what is actualized is the becoming of a potentiality, but nothing separates this becoming from its full, unbounded potentiality. And representation is the bad faith, employed to cover the full potentiality of a being. *Cf. Sartre, Jean-Paul. L'Être et le Néant. Paris: Gallimard, 1949, pp.85-115.*

⁵¹ *Cf. Deleuze, Gilles. Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque. Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 2005, passim.*

⁵² *DI*, p.103.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.32.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.33.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.43.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Not the red as the highest adjective of some red-colored thing, but red in particular, the red of that rose, the red of this book, and so on.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Cf. Peter Gidal's introductory essay titled Theory and Definition of Structural/Materialist Film: Gidal, Peter. "Theory and Definition of Structural/Materialist Film". In: Structural Film Anthology, BFI, 1976. Available online at: http://www.luxonline.org.uk/articles/theory_and_definition%281%29.html*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix. *Kafka: pour une littérature mineure*. Ljubljana: LUD Literatura, 1995, p.20.

⁶³ It is a plus-sign, a sign made of more than the saussurean binary structure. The sign as a creating and emanating power. On the various notions of signs opposed to the saussurean *cf. Peirce, Charles S. Selected Philosophical Writings*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1998; Derrida, Jacques. *De la grammatologie*. Paris: Minuit, 1967; Barthes, Roland. *Ouvres complètes*. Paris: Seuil, 2002; Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix. *L'anti-Œdipe*. Torino: Einaudi, 1975, pp.272-278 and *passim*; Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Félix. *A Thousand Plateaus*. London, New York: Continuum, 2004, pp.74-79, 124-126 and *passim* and Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 2. L'image-temps*. Milano: Ubulibri, 2001, pp.43-47.

⁶⁴ These signs are moments of the present (*cf. DR*, p.20, 57, 222 and *passim*), this making them something of an event, or what Deleuze calls "sense". As he affirms in *The Logic of Sense*: "[s]ense is not to be confused with signification; it is rather what is attributed in such a way that it determines both the signifier and the signified as such." (LS, p.58). Because, as Hallward says: "signification is merely a category of representation." (Hallward, Peter. *Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*. London, New York: Verso, 2006, p. 76) Signification is an attribute of representation, the stand-still point of the actual; sense, on the contrary, is "the primary and determining aspect of expression." (*ibid.*)

⁶⁵ Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 2001, p.125.

⁶⁶ Even if a movie transgresses filmic language, it does so in relation to filmic language. This means that it

negates a rule of the normality of filmic language.

⁶⁷ "Never make equal what is unequal." (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*)

⁶⁸ Cf. Lacan, Jacques. *Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre 20, Encore: 1972-1973*. Paris: Seuil, 1975.

⁶⁹ Cf. QP, p.121 and *passim*

⁷⁰ Palm, Michael. "Which Way?, Drei Pfade durchs Bild-Gebüsch von Kurt Kren." In: Hans Scheugl (ed.), *Ex Underground Kurt Kren. Seine Filme*, Wien 1996. Available online at:

http://filmvideo.at/filmdb_display.php?id=248&type=3&docid=163&len=en

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Shown in this image, available online at:

http://www.atelier-augarten.at/ausstellungen_en/kren/bilder/gr/kren_tv_01.jpg